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Act LVIII of 2001 on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, which entered into effect on 13 July 2001, defines the primary objective of
Hungary’s central bank as the achievement and maintenance of price stability. Low inflation allows the economy to function
more effectively, contributes to better economic growth over time and helps to moderate cyclical fluctuations in output and
employment.
In the inflation targeting system, from August 2005 the Bank seeks to attain price stability by ensuring an inflation rate near
the 3 per cent medium term objective. The Monetary Council, the supreme decision-making body of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank,
performs a comprehensive review of the expected development of inflation every three months, in order to establish the
monetary conditions consistent with achieving the inflation target. The Council’s decision is the result of careful consideration
of a wide range of factors, including an assessment of prospective economic developments, the inflation outlook, money and
capital market trends and risks to stability.
In order to provide the public with clear insight into the operation of monetary policy and to enhance transparency, the Bank
publishes the information available at the time of making its monetary policy decisions. The Report presents the inflation
forecasts prepared by the Monetary Strategy and Economic Analysis and Financial Analysis, as well as the macroeconomic
developments underlying these forecast. The Report is published biannually, with partial updates to the forecasts also prepared
twice a year. The forecasts of the Monetary Strategy and Economic Analysis and Financial Analysis are based on certain
assumptions. Hence, in producing its forecasts, the Directorate assumes an unchanged monetary and fiscal policy. In respect of
economic variables exogenous to monetary policy, the forecasting rules used in previous issues of the Report are applied.
The analyses in this Report were prepared by staff in the MNB’s Monetary Strategy and Economic Analysis and Financial
Analysis under the general direction of Ágnes Csermely, Director. The project was managed by Mihály András Kovács,
Deputy Head of Monetary Strategy and Economic Analysis, with the help of Zoltán Gyenes and Barnabás Virág. The Report
was approved for publication by Ferenc Karvalits, Deputy Governor.
Primary contributors to this Report also include: Péter Bauer, Szilárd Benk, Gyõzõ Eppich, Péter Gál, Zoltán Gyenes, Áron
Horváth, Éva Kaponya, András Komáromi, Mihály András Kovács, Zsolt Lovas, Ádám Martonosi, Zsuzsa Munkácsi, Benedek
Nobilis, György Pulai, Róbert Szemere, Tímea Várnai, Barnabás Virág. Other contributors to the analyses and forecasts in this
Report include various staff members of the Monetary Strategy and Economic Analysis and the Financial Analysis.
The Report incorporates valuable input from the Monetary Council’s comments and suggestions following its meetings on 13
May and 26 May 2008. The projections and policy considerations, however, reflect the views of staff in the Monetary
Strategy and Economic Analysis and the Financial Analysis and do not necessarily reflect those of the Monetary Council or
the MNB.
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Recently, inflation has been affected by a series of negative supply and cost
shocks. Slow economic growth was only able to counter the rise caused by
these shocks to a limited extent. Stubbornly high inflation has increased the risk
that inflation expectations may become permanently anchored at high levels
and necessitated the tightening of monetary conditions. The MNB raised its
policy rate from 7.5% to 8.25% in two steps, and the exchange rate of the
forint also appreciated significantly.
The May issue of the Report projects steady disinflation, provided that the
average monetary conditions for April (EUR/HUF 253.8 and a base rate of
8.25%) and our other basic assumptions hold true. Nevertheless, the rate of
inflation will exceed the inflation target over the horizon of 5–8 quarters which
is relevant for monetary policy. Upside inflation risks may increase if the recent
deterioration in the global inflation environment continues. In respect of
domestic factors, upside risks to inflation could stem from economic agents
passing on cost shocks to their clients to an increasingly large extent or relying
on past inflation in their decisions on prices and wages more strongly than
assumed in the baseline scenario. We project a gradual pick-up in growth, but
the output gap will remain negative over the entire forecast horizon. At the same
time, there are downside risks to growth, as the turbulence caused by the sub-
prime crisis may lead to a more persistent global slowdown than assumed.
The international inflation environment continued to deteriorate over the past
quarter for two reasons. First international commodity prices continued to rise,
even though there was a downward adjustment in some unprocessed food
prices. Second, as an effect of the earlier increases consumer price inflation in
developed economies surged to multi-annual highs. However, the pick-up in
consumer price inflation in these countries may be linked primarily to the
direct effects of rises in energy and food prices; and there is little evidence of a
sharp acceleration in inflation across other product groups.
In respect of the domestic economy, the negative output gap continued to
widen in 2008 Q1, i.e. economic activity resulted in disinflationary effects.
However, this trend did not affect the economic sectors in an uniform manner,
as Hungarian economic growth continued to be characterised by two main
aspects: exporting firms were producing at a high level of capacity utilisation
amidst historically benign external business conditions, while domestic demand
remained very subdued compared with earlier years.
Inflation declined slowly in the first quarter of 2008. The disinflationary effects
of the growth environment were limited, with the rise in imported inflationary
pressures and domestic cost shocks playing a role in this regard. One of these
influences was the increase in producers’ electricity prices, which was discussed
in the February Report, but turned out to be somewhat stronger than
anticipated; another was the unfavourable development in the labour market
in relation to future inflation.
Inflation may remain above target at the
horizon relevant for monetary policy
Imported inflationary pressure has
continued to build up recently
Domestic determinants of inflation still
characterised by the two trends of a
negative output gap and mounting cost
pressures
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Overview
1 For details, see Box 3-2.
Employment continued to fall in both the private and public sectors.
Additionally, wage growth in the private sector in the first couple months of
the year was stronger than we originally projected, but there is a high degree
of uncertainty about the interpretation of the latest data due to changes in
regulations. This phenomenon may have been related to the stronger-than-
expected increase in the minimum wage for skilled workers. The minimum
wage for skilled workers has been gradually increasing over the past three years
and the latest, and presumably effective, significant increase represents yet
another negative cost shock. After the series of shocks observed since the
summer of 2006 (initially the increases in tax and contribution rates as well as
in administered prices, related to fiscal adjustments, and then the sharp rises in
unprocessed food prices and increases in energy prices from the summer of
2007), the corporate sector must now adjust to further upward pressures on
costs.
Although the deteriorating earnings position of firms continues to exert a
strong pressure to adjust, the May projection forecasts wage growth
decelerating more slowly than expected and employment falling more
markedly than earlier. Meanwhile, the pressure on firms to increase prices is
stronger than previously expected.
In the current projection, economic growth picks up slowly, in line with the
forecast presented in the February Report, with the rate of GDP growth in
Hungary only expected to rise above its longer-term potential rate in 2010.
Consequently, the output gap will remain negative over the entire forecast
period.
A gradual rebalancing of growth towards domestic demand is expected, while
the contribution of net exports to growth is likely to fall. The latter is expected
to be driven by slowing Hungarian exports, due to the slackening in
international economic activity on the one hand, and by rising import needs
related to the gradual pick-up in domestic demand on the other hand.
As far as the components of domestic demand are concerned, consumption and
investment are expected to expand slowly in the period ahead. Meanwhile,
public sector services are likely to fall at a diminishing pace, and then to
increase slightly, simultaneously with the decrease in the speed of fiscal
adjustment.
Hungary’s export sector is unlikely to slow significantly over the short term,
due to the pick-up in German industrial activity at the beginning of the year.
The longer-term outlook, however, has grown less benign recently, due to the
deterioration in world economic prospects.
Stronger-than-expected wage growth may lead to a faster increase in
consumption than forecast in February, but the short-term prospects for
investment have worsened, closely related to the slump in construction activity.
In the central projection, the main determinants of the disinflation process are
the same as in February. Inflationary pressures are expected to subside, based
on two factors: firstly, our assumptions about international commodity prices,
i.e. that prices will stop rising and food prices will see some downward
correction later in the year. Secondly, the output gap is expected to remain
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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The increase in skilled workers’
minimum wage had a stronger-than-
expected effect. Looking forward, it may
cause a slowdown in the wage
adjustment process
Two key factors for disinflation to
continue are the development of
commodity prices and the negative
output gap
Slow recovery in real economic activity
OVERVIEW
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negative over the entire forecast period, forcing wage adjustment and modest
price increases relative to costs.
The central projection envisages a lower general government deficit on an
accrual basis (ESA) in 2008 than the target in the Convergence Programme. In
2009–2010, the deficit targets in the Convergence Programme can be met if
fiscal policy remains tight and fiscal reserves are blocked in part or in full.
However, over the next two years the strong growth in tax and contribution
receipts, which facilitated the previous rapid reduction in deficit, is likely to be
reversed, and the expenditure-side measures outlined in the Convergence
Programme will have to ensure the further reduction in deficit. At the same
time, this latter aspect is also the most important source of uncertainty
surrounding the forecast for the budget deficit. Exceeding the spending
estimates may result in a higher deficit compared with what is targeted in the
Convergence Programme.
In the May projection, external balance improves, simultaneously with fiscal
adjustment. However, the pace of deficit reduction may be slower than
observed last year, as the speed of fiscal adjustment slows.
Inflation fan chart*
0
5
 Q
1
0
5
 Q
2
0
5
 Q
3
0
5
 Q
4
0
6
 Q
1
0
6
 Q
2
0
6
 Q
3
0
6
 Q
4
0
7
 Q
1
0
7
 Q
2
0
7
 Q
3
0
7
 Q
4
0
8
 Q
1
0
8
 Q
2
0
8
 Q
3
0
8
 Q
4
0
9
 Q
1
0
9
 Q
2
0
9
 Q
3
0
9
 Q
4
1
0
 Q
1
1
0
 Q
2
1
0
 Q
3
1
0
 Q
4
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Per cent
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Per cent
Unfavourable external
environment
Higher inflation
expectations
Baseline Facts
GDP fan chart*
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
0
5
 Q
1
0
5
 Q
2
0
5
 Q
3
0
5
 Q
4
0
6
 Q
1
0
6
 Q
2
0
6
 Q
3
0
6
 Q
4
0
7
 Q
1
0
7
 Q
2
0
7
 Q
3
0
7
 Q
4
0
8
 Q
1
0
8
 Q
2
0
8
 Q
3
0
8
 Q
4
0
9
 Q
1
0
9
 Q
2
0
9
 Q
3
0
9
 Q
4
1
0
 Q
1
1
0
 Q
2
1
0
 Q
3
1
0
 Q
4
Per cent
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Per cent
Baseline
Unfavourable external environment
Higher inflation expectations
Facts
The budget deficit targets set in the
Convergence Programme may be met
with a strict controls on expenditures
* Details of the risk scenario are presented in Chapter 3.2.
* Details of the risk scenario are presented in Chapter 3.2.
QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION • MAY 200810
(The forecasts are conditional: the baseline scenario represents the most probable scenario, which applies only if all of the
assumptions presented in Chapter 3 materialise; unless otherwise indicated, it represents percentage changes on the previous
year.)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Actual Projection
Inflation (annual average)
Core inflation1 2.4 6.0 5.0 3.7 3.0
Consumer price index 3.9 8.0 6.3 4.2 3.0
Economic growth
External demand (GDP-based) 3.9 3.5 2.5 2.3 2.3
Fiscal impact on demand2 0.4 -3.6 -1.5 -0.1 -0.8
Household consumption 2.1 -2.1 0.3 1.6 3.1
Gross fixed capital formation -2.8 1.0 3.2 5.1 6.8
Domestic absorption 1.1 -0.3 1.1 2.9 3.8
Exports 18.9 14.2 10.8 9.4 10.6
Imports3 14.5 12.2 9.8 9.3 11.0
GDP* 3.9 (4.0) 1.3 2.2 (2.4) 3.2 (3.0) 3.7
Current account deficit
As a percentage of GDP 6.1 5.0 4.9 4.8 4.8
In EUR billions 5.4 5.1 5.3 5.5 6.0
External financing requirement
As a percentage of GDP 5.3 4.0 3.4 2.8 2.5
Labour market
Whole-economy gross average earnings4 8.2 8.0 8.8 6.5 6.7
Whole-economy employment5 0.7 -0.1 -1.4 0.1 0.4
Private sector gross average earnings6 9.4 (8.1) 9.1 (8.2) 9.0 (8.2) 7.2 6.8
Private sector employment5 1.2 0.9 -1.1 0.0 0.5
Unit labour costs in the private sector5,7 4.4 8.1 4.2 3.9 3.5
Household real income -0.1** -3.3 1.5 2.4 2.7
1
For technical reasons, this indicator may temporarily differ from the index published by the CSO; over the long term, however, it follows a similar
trend.
2
Calculated from the so-called augmented (SNA) balance; a negative value means a narrowing of aggregate demand.
3
As a result of uncertainty in the measurement of foreign trade statistics, from 2004 the actual import figure and current account deficit/external
financing requirement may be higher than suggested by official figures, or our projections based on such figures.
4
Calculated on a cash-flow basis.
5
According to the CSO LFS data.
6
According to the original CSO data. The numbers in brackets refer to wages excluding the effect of whitening and the changed seasonality of bonuses.
7
Private sector unit labour cost calculated with a wage index excluding the effect of whitening and the changed seasonality of bonuses. 
* Data not adjusted for calendar-day variations are shown in brackets.
** MNB estimate.
Summary table of the baseline scenario
1  Inflation and its determining factors

A slow turnaround in economic growth
The rate of economic growth in 2007 decelerated
significantly compared to previous years, reaching just 1.3
per cent. Throughout 2007, deceleration was accompanied
by two aspects, namely weak domestic demand resulting
from the implementation of the fiscal austerity package, and
favourable foreign economic activity. As a result of the
favourable foreign activity, companies in the export-oriented
manufacturing industry registered dynamic growth. By
contrast, the fiscal adjustments resulted in deceleration
directly through the decline in government services on the
one hand (on the expenditure side: social transfers in kind,
government investment and consumption; on the production
side: public services and construction), and indirectly
through their impact on domestic demand on the other hand
(on the expenditure side: household consumption, corporate
investment; on the production side: construction, market
services).
2
Along with the one-off impacts of the fiscal adjustments,
Hungarian agriculture also suffered a sector-specific shock
due to poor weather conditions. This presumably one-off
phenomenon had a considerable impact on the agricultural
sector’s contribution to GDP growth, as a result of which
agriculture made a historically low, negative contribution to
the economic growth in 2007 (-0.5 percentage points).
On the whole, without the impact of the presumably
temporary factors (fiscally-induced decline in demand,
deterioration in agriculture performance), economic growth
would have been around 2.5 per cent last year, representing
a significant drop compared to the trend seen in previous
years. This was basically due to weaker output by the
domestic market service sector.
At the beginning of this year, we projected a slow turnaround
in economic growth, which seems to be confirmed by the
preliminary data on growth for the first quarter. In the first
three months of this year, the 0.9 per cent annual increase –
adjusted for the calendar effect – is hardly more favourable
than the average expansion registered in the second half of
last year. The quarterly trends in GDP confirm that the
slowdown in the domestic economy following the fiscal
1.1  Real economic activity
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Chart 1-1
Contribution of the main production items of GDP to
annual GDP growth
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Note: In the figure, the value added of each sector is at basis prices. The
discrepancy between the GDP growth rate and the sum of the
contributions of each sector to it is due to the missing ‘taxes and subsidies
on production’ item.
The public services were approximated with the services related mainly to
the public sector (public administration, education, health and social work
and other community, social and personal service activities).
Chart 1-2
Economic growth in Hungary
(seasonally adjusted data)
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* For the period before 2005, we used the publication of the detailed 2007
Q4 CSO GDP data.
2 It is curious that quantification of the impact of the general government’s adjustments arrives at a completely different range of figures for the production and
expenditure sides of GDP. While the decline of the sectors related mostly to public services reduced GDP by 0.3 percentage points on the production side, the negative
impact of the decline in government items on the demand side reached nearly 1.5 percentage points. Consequently, the value of the statistical errors and ommissions,
which shows the discrepancy between the production and expenditure sides, was markedly positive. The effect of the decline in government output on economic
growth supposedly could be between the two values. Since to our knowledge, for annual GDP figures the measurement of production side processes is the
determining factor, we believe the direct impact of the government may be observed realistically in the lower half of this range.
adjustments has passed its low point, but that the recovery is
very modest.
The preliminary GDP figure for the first quarter
presumably includes numerous one-off impacts which were
more favourable than in 2007. Hence, it can be assumed
that in the slowly accelerating economy, a rebound in
sources of sustained growth (primarily investment, and
partly private consumption) has not yet occurred, whilst the
prospects of the export sector, which contributed to GDP
growth to a large extent, are expected to gradually
deteriorate.
In terms of one-off effects, with regard to the first quarter
it worth emphasising developments in agriculture and the
public sector. Following the unfavourable weather
conditions last year, circumstances this year are likely to be
more benign for agricultural production and hence this
sector may become a significant positive growth factor.
After the diminishing primary effects of the fiscal
adjustment, we do not expect further negative impacts from
the public sector this year.
3
Considering the behaviour of the majority of domestic
economic agents, the improving income position of
households at the beginning of the year and the turnaround
in retail sales in January and February suggest a slow recovery
in household consumption.
In the field of investment, however, no turnaround has been
observed yet. Following the unfavourable development in
construction-type investment last year, the subdued
performance of construction suggests further decline. At the
same time, we expect equipment-type investment to decrease
as well, as the external environment becomes more
unfavourable. The latter effect negatively impacts the
prospects of export companies which were working in a
favourable international environment in the first quarter.In
the light of the most recent actual data, we re-examined our
estimates on potential GDP (for details, see Box 3-1). Our
potential GDP estimates between 2004 and 2006 indicate a
positive output gap, which resulted from an expansive fiscal
policy, and favourable external demand. By 2007, however,
the measures taken to improve fiscal balance generated a
negative output gap. Through its impact on demand, this
process may have moderated the pricing decisions made by
the economy, hence, on the whole, it may have put a brake
on inflation driven by cost shocks.
Moderate deceleration in the European economic
activity
A strong slowdown in economic growth started in the United
States as early as 2007 Q4, and the macroeconomic
indicators published since suggest a further decline. On the
other hand, in contrast with earlier analyses, it seems that the
economy has not slipped into recession.
Considering the close commercial and financial relations
between the USA and the European Union, the forecasts
published by international institutions predict that a spill-
over effect of the American slowdown will affect Europe; up
to now, however, no signs of this have been observed. Euro-
area GDP growth in 2008 Q1 was 2.2 per cent in year-on-
year terms and thus came in higher than the market’s
expectations. Despite these positive signs, German industrial
production showed signs of deceleration in March, and there
was also a decrease in new orders, suggesting further gradual
weakening in economic activity in the euro area from 2008
Q2. Key economic indicators are also pointing in this
direction and fell sharply in April. The forecasts of important
international institutions are also pointing to further
deterioration in international economic conditions.
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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Chart 1-3
Output gap*
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* There are four different methods to estimate the size of the output gap.
This chart indicates the range between the minimum and maximum
values of those estimates.
3 At the same time, we should note that the measurement of the performance of the agricultural sector in the first quarter GDP data is quite uncertain, as there is still
no data available on the annual harvest results at this early point in time.
While the data from the EU-15 countries indicated a
downturn in economic activities as early as the second half
of last year, economic growth in the region continued to
accelerate in 2007, largely due to the dynamic increase of
domestic demand. Nevertheless, on the basis of the
preliminary data for 2008 Q1 signs of sagging growth were
also seen in these countries. Since this CEE region
constitutes roughly 20 per cent of Hungary’s export market,
the pace at which the region adjusts to the slowdown in the
developed countries is a key factor in terms of Hungary’s
prospects.
With respect to domestic economic conditions, our earlier
assumption projected gradual deceleration in exports, but
data on the first two months of the year did not confirm this,
because, in line with the developments in Germany and in the
region, the dynamics of industrial exports recovered
somewhat. Otherwise in March, there was a significant
correction in the data, so we believe that this rebound early in
the year was only a temporary phenomenon, which was
observed both in the domestic and the regional data. Slowing
economic activity in the euro area will be a dominant factor in
the prospects of the export-oriented industry in the region.
INFLATION AND ITS DETERMINING FACTORS
QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION • MAY 2008 15
Chart 1-4
Industrial production and new orders in Germany*
(yearly changes calculated from trend data)
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Chart 1-6
GDP growth in the region
9
6
 Q
1
9
6
 Q
3
9
7
 Q
1
9
7
 Q
3
9
8
 Q
3
9
8
 Q
1
9
8
 Q
3
9
9
 Q
1
9
9
 Q
3
0
0
 Q
1
0
0
 Q
3
0
1
 Q
1
0
1
 Q
3
0
2
 Q
1
0
2
 Q
3
0
3
 Q
1
0
3
 Q
3
0
4
 Q
1
0
4
 Q
3
0
5
 Q
1
0
5
 Q
3
0
6
 Q
1
0
6
 Q
3
0
7
 Q
1
0
7
 Q
3
0
8
 Q
1
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
% (year/year growth)
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
% (year/year growth)
Eurozone Czech Republic Hungary
Poland Slovakia
Note: source of international data: Eurostat.
Chart 1-7
Industrial production in the region and the euro area
(yearly changes, calculated from seasonally adjusted data)
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Chart 1-5
Changes in the IFO and EABCI confidence indicators*
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While the trend in exports of goods developed similarly to
the path of industrial production, the increase in imports of
goods was due to the modest rise in domestic demand, mainly
caused by household consumption and corporate investment
in machinery. The growth rate of goods exports has
continued to exceed the dynamics of goods imports, and thus
in early 2008, we expect net exports to still make a positive
contribution to GDP growth. However this positive
contribution is expected to decline as the year progresses, as
domestic demand is expected to increase and the
international economic activity is decelerating.
Signs of a turning point in domestic demand
Due to shrinking domestic demand resulting from the fiscal
austerity package, the declining consumption of households
and dwindling government orders, the position of companies
producing products and services for the domestic market has
deteriorated significantly. In addition, this is combined with
a dynamic hike in the prices of raw materials on the one
hand, and the growth of expenditures generated by the
austerity package (higher tax and contribution liabilities,
substantial increase in energy costs) on the other hand. On
the whole, we assume that the majority of domestic
companies were faced with a significant deterioration in
profits. As the primary effects of the fiscal adjustments wear
off and domestic demand starts to recover, the prospects of
the corporate sector may gradually improve.
On the other hand, for most sectors no significant positive
turnaround can be observed yet; so we assume that the recovery
of domestic demand will be a slow process. Based on business
confidence indicators, the prospects of the sectors have still not
yet improved, which may be a reason for uncertainty.
With respect to the domestic components of growth, only the
household sector shows some signs of improvement. As the
primary effects of the fiscal adjustment package wore off,
after a substantial contraction in 2007, the income position
of households experienced a slight boost in the first months
of the year: the net real wage-bill stagnated or slightly
increased. Retail data of the first two months of the year
indicate a reversal of the former downward trend, apparently
confirming the signs of improving prospects. In fact, this may
signal moderate growth in the consumption of households in
2008 Q1.
In 2007, households attempted to counterbalance the effects
of the income shock by taking out loans, and using financial
assets. Even though in our February Report we forecast
growth in household savings in conjunction with the decrease
in employment, the net financing ability of households
proportionate to GDP stagnated throughout 2007, and this
tendency appears to be continuing in the first months of this
year. At the same time, growth in consumer loans slowed
slightly, which is in line with the moderate growth of
consumption, and the significantly improving income
position of households.
Despite a temporary recovery in the middle of 2007, there
are still no signs of a tangible improvement on the housing
market. Based on 2008 Q1 data there was a slight increase in
the sale of new homes, but the number of building permits
issued for new houses decreased, particularly in Budapest,
which is considered to be the biggest market, where the
decline compared to the first quarter of last year reached
approximately 30 per cent.
In terms of the prospects for the household sector, one
downside risk is the potential increase in credit margins
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Chart 1-8
Economic sentiment indicators
(3-month simple moving averages)
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Chart 1-9
Development of retail sales and the GKI consumer
confidence indicator
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trend
triggered by the sub-prime crisis, and the impact that the
decrease in employment may have on households’ propensity
for consumption and investment. These tendencies might
already be reflected in the confidence indicators for the
household sector, as these indicators still do not show any
sign of improvement.
Construction industry output declined steadily during 2007,
with this tendency continuing in the first months of 2008.
One major reason for the decline was the lack of large
government investments, which had a severe impact on the
sector.
4
The fact that the time series of the construction
contract portfolio, which is used to forecast the dynamics of
the construction industry output, does not indicate a solid
turning point, casts a negative shadow over future prospects.
Additionally, it portends continuing weak growth in national
investment, considering that building structures constitute
more than half of national investment.
On the other hand, the volume of investments for last year
slightly exceeded our expectations. This is due to the
manufacturing industry,
5
which was able to generate a relatively
strong expansion in investment despite worsening external
demand prospects, while the corporate sector, which relies
mostly on domestic demand and reflects domestic business
expectations, was unable to improve its investment activity. In
addition, the items of quasi-fiscal investments settled in a lump
sum at the end of the year may have also contributed to the
better-than-expected investment figures (road construction and
developments related to energy providers).
With respect to central government investments, negative
tendencies continued for the central government in general,
and local governments in particular. As mentioned above, the
construction industry’s contract portfolio continued to
weaken at the beginning of 2008, and thus no significant
turnaround is expected in the short run for construction-type
investments. Looking forward, this may indicate that the use
of EU funds, which are considered to be the most powerful
driving force behind the demand for central government
investment, will continue to be deferred. The sectors with ties
to the government are expected to receive 70–80 per cent of
the EU funds, but they do not appear to have caused a
significant investment boost thus far. The question arises as
to what extent these funds will increase the volume of
investments compared to earlier projections.
At the beginning of 2007, the stock of inventories
6
in the
commercial sectors increased parallel with the decline of the
aggregate demand, and its level remained rather high
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Chart 1-10
Investments and capacity utilisation in
manufacturing
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
9
5
 Q
1
9
5
 Q
3
9
6
 Q
1
9
6
 Q
3
9
7
 Q
1
9
7
 Q
3
9
8
 Q
1
9
8
 Q
3
9
9
 Q
1
9
9
 Q
3
0
0
 Q
1
0
0
 Q
3
0
1
 Q
1
0
1
 Q
3
0
2
 Q
1
0
2
 Q
3
0
3
 Q
1
0
3
 Q
3
0
4
 Q
1
0
4
 Q
3
0
5
 Q
1
0
5
 Q
3
0
6
 Q
1
0
6
 Q
3
0
7
 Q
1
0
7
 Q
3
Per cent (annual volume changes)
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
Per cent
Foreign demand
Manufacturing investment (~22%)
Manufacturing investment
(without rubber industry in 2007)
Capacity utilisation (left hand scale)
Chart 1-11
Investments in various sectors of the national
economy
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4 Approximately 45 per cent of construction output is related to other construction work (such as roads and bridges), which largely depend on government orders.
5 However, the concentrated nature of the upturn, namely, that this growth is largely related to the rubber industry, implies that these developments are somewhat
vulnerable.
6 Inventory changes combined with the statistical error contributed significantly to the GDP growth seen last year. The current price figures of the inventory changes
now published for the first time in the GDP statistics may suggest that this growth was primarily due to the growth of the statistical error.
throughout the year. Considering that the expectations of
commercial companies continue to be unfavourable,
inventory accumulation in this sector may indicate a drastic
drop in demand that exceeds even the expectations of the
merchants. The lower inventory demand caused by slowing
industrial production may account for the decelerating
dynamics of inventory growth.
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Chart 1-12
Inventory changes in the main economic sectors*
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* The detailed data of stocks of inventory only appertain to companys
with at least 50 employees. The sum of these Iinventory changes is
different from the inventory changes from the GDP statistics (including
all companies).
Deceleration of wage dynamics may be slower than
expected
The February Report assumed, that over the short run
companies would attempt to restore profitability by limiting
their bonus payments, then, starting from 2008, by reducing
regular wage payments and employment. Actual data
received since the last Report indicate that staff reduction
may be even stronger than anticipated, or could occur in a
different structure; while wage adjustments may require a
longer period of time due to the increased minimum wages of
skilled workers.
Based on quarterly data on private sector wages in 2008
Q1, we saw an acceleration in wage dynamics compared to
the same period of the previous year. Considering the
monthly developments, the examined period could be
divided in two parts. In January-February, we saw a strong
acceleration in wage dynamics i.e. the annual wage index
increased by 3 percentage points, according to the
underlying wage index (filtering the effects of the changed
seasonality of bonuses and whitening), and then a
correction occurred in March. However, the data should be
interpreted fairly conservatively, taking into account the
regulatory changes, and the stronger wage growth may have
been caused, for the most part, by the statutory minimum
wage increase.
7
According to our estimates, the impact of the regulation on the
annual January wage index amounts to about 2 percentage
points, and may have had prolonged, indirect effects also in
February. Thus, the entire impact may have exceeded our
expectation. In line with the regulatory change, the jump in
wage dynamics may have been influenced by timing
considerations as well. The relevant time series suggest that
regular wages are normally adjusted between March and May.
It is not inconceivable however, that, in view of the regulations
affecting the statutory minimum wage, companies scheduled
their regular wage increase at a date earlier than usual this year.
This concept was underpinned by the March data, because
there was a strong correction in case of regular wages.
At the sector level, the strong but slowing wage growth in the
manufacturing industry correlates with the strong export
activities and the high capacity utilisation of the sector.
Considering the impact of the factors described above, we
assume that the labour market for manufacturing jobs is
considerably tighter than in the other segments of the private
sector.
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Chart 1-13
Wage development in the private sector
(seasonally adjusted, quarterly data; annual rate of change)
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Chart 1-14
Wage development in the manufacturing industry
(seasonally adjusted, quarterly data; annual rate of change)
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7 On the one hand, wage dynamics experienced a boost primarily in the service sectors, which are in a less favourable situation in terms of economic conditions and
facing a considerably looser labour market; on the other hand, data analysed according to company size indicate that the growth took place among the small and
medium-sized companies which are most likely to be affected by the increased minimum wage. In addition to these factors it is conceivable, too, that the acceleration
of wages might also be related to the high level of inflation observed in the last period. Albeit, it is possible that (in contrast with our previous assumptions) the
increased minimum wage did not mean a fully ‘true’ acceleration in wage dynamics, but partly reflects the further whitening of the economy. Although there is a great
uncertainty regarding this question, according to the data available it seems that a considerable decrease occurred in the number of manual workers in the mostly
affected market services sector, moreover the jump in gross wages affects companies having even more employees. All of these indicate that the minimum wage hike
in 2008 was essentially effective. For more details, see Box 1-1.
At the same time, the sharp upturn of wage growth observed
in market services cannot be justified by the economic
conditions, and is assumed to be related to the regulatory
changes. It should be noted, that the statutory minimum
wage increase is presumed to have had a more significant
impact on this sector in general.
8
Regarding the companies
presumably most unaffected by the minimum wage changes,
those with over 250 employees, regular wages continued to
decrease.
9
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Chart 1-15
Development of wages at companies with over 250
employees
(annual growth rate based on the regular wage component)
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Earlier issues of the Report have already addressed the distortion effects
of data on wages caused by turning informal economy into a formal
one.10 Because the labour market was hit by various shocks due to a
variety of government measures in 2006 H2 (in addition to measures
aimed at transforming the informal economy into a lawful one i.e.
‘whitening of black and grey economies’, a minimum wage in skilled
jobs was introduced), it is difficult to tell the extent to which the various
types of measures may have contributed to a rapid increase in wage
growth.
A look at private sector wages in a breakdown by company size reveals
that a rapid increase in wages from mid-2006 was triggered by several
hikes in wages at the effective dates of the government measures. Data
clearly reveal the impact of introduction of guaranteed minimum wage
in July 2006, raised in early 2007 and tax and contribution liabilities on
twice the minimum wage in September 2007.
Our estimates show that the 2006 introduction of the guaranteed
minimum wage led to higher wages only in the case of businesses with
5 to 19 employees. With regard to the private sector as a whole, its
extent is likely to have been 0.3 per cent. The impact of tax and
contribution liabilities on twice the minimum wage was around 1.8 per
cent; thus, wage acceleration in the whole of 2006 due to authority
measures matches up with our earlier estimates.11 The increase in the
guaranteed minimum wage in early 2007 resulted in an approximately
1.1 to 1.3 per cent rise in wages, of which, based on our earlier results,
approximately 0.5 per cent was attributable to the further whitening of
black/grey economies. Thus, approximately two-thirds of the whitening
reflected in wage statistics is likely to have been caused by measures
Box 1-1: Methodological issues regarding wage developments
8 According to the regulations of the Hungarian Tax and Financial Control Administration (APEH), raising the minimum wages of skilled workers became mandatory
from February. However, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour reported that the majority of the companies had complied with the relevant regulations as early as
January.
9 However, it should be noted that gross wages among companies with more than 250 employees jumped considerably in March, which should be linked to the huge
bonus payment in the ‘Transport, storage and communication’ industry.
10 See the May and August 2007 issues of the Report.
11 See Gyõzõ Eppich and Szabolcs Lõrincz: Three methods to estimate the whitening-related distortion of the wage statistics, MNB Occasional Papers, 66.
Chart 1-16
Changes in regular wage by headcount
categories
(annual change)
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Further decreases in employment
The adjustment path of our February Report projected a
modest drop in employment, in particular over the long run.
The data received since then, however, indicate a stronger
adjustment through employment reduction than we had
expected, although its impact on the tightness of the labour
market may be ambiguous.
In 2007 Q4, employment seemed to decrease both at the
level of national economy and in the private sector.
12
In
contrast with our assumptions set out in the February Report,
it appears that the drop in employment was reflected in the
reduced number of active workers, rather than in increased
unemployment. The time series of employment, activity and
unemployment suggest that this is not a unique phenomenon.
Employment has had a greater impact on activity than
unemployment even in the past. Data continue to suggest that
the majority of those losing their jobs become inactive, rather
than joining the group of the unemployed. This may be partly
due to timing considerations associated with retirement
regulations, and another part of it could be explained by the
fact that a group of inactive workers may have stronger ties
to the labour market than the rest.
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aimed at it, while the remaining part by a raise in the guaranteed
minimum wage. The early 2008 raise in the guaranteed minimum wage
already affected larger corporations as well. This confirms the fact that –
taking into account employment developments at small companies in
2007 – a raise in the minimum wage of skilled workers in 2008 can be
regarded as effective increase in the wage-bill.
In early 2007 and 2008 a further bias was detected in wage statistics,
which can be linked to hikes in employment customary in the early
months of each year. This bias stems from the fact that, regarding the
structure of the economy as a whole, unexpected rises in staffing levels
were experienced only in certain groups, rather than homogeneously.
In respect of the composition of jobs, it was the number of non-manual
employees that rose in January in both 2007 and 2008; their average
wage being higher than that of manual labourers. As a consequence, a
shift in the composition of the numbers employed led to an upward
bias in the wage index.
In our opinion, this bias arises from the methodology of wage statistics,
as the Central Statistical Office collects comprehensive data only on
companies with over 50 employees. For companies with 5 to 49
employees it applies the method of representative sampling to collect
data. Classification in headcount categories occurs once a year, at the
beginning of each year. Thus, we hypothesise that sudden rises in the
headcount at the beginning of each year are a consequence of re-
classifications during data recording. What makes the calculation of the
extent of the bias difficult is that we have no information on whether
rises in the headcount at the beginning of each year are the
consequences of interim processes or merely represent a statistical bias.
Our calculations reveal that the maximum degree of bias is likely to
have been around 0.5 per cent in 2008 (provided that there is no actual
economic trend underlying the rise in the headcount). In preparing our
wage projection we decided not to exclude this bias because of the
aforementioned uncertainty.
Chart 1-17
Numbers of manual and non-manual workers in
private services 
(seasonally adjusted, quarterly data)
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Chart 1-18
Numbers of manual and non-manual workers in
private sector 
(seasonally adjusted, quarterly data)
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12 According to institutional statistics covering companies employing more than 5 individuals, January 2008 saw a sharp increase. See the Box 1-1. for possible
explanations.
The ratio of the permanently jobless appears be increasing
within the group of the unemployed. In light of the
increasing level of inactivity and the number of the
permanently unemployed the question arises: to what extent
did the downturn contribute to loosening in the labour
market? In other words: to what extent are the observations
described above a consequence of cyclical or long-term
developments? Based on our current understanding there is
no obvious answer to this question; in the past we have seen
activity and employment moving in tandem according to
business cycles. In any case, the fact that the number of the
permanently unemployed has been on the rise steadily since
2006 may be a warning sign of existing structural problems
in the labour market.
In a sectoral breakdown, 2007 Q4 saw a downturn in
labour demand and correspondingly in hours worked, in
the manufacturing industry, while less prominent segments
of the private sector (including construction, agriculture,
electricity and mining) continued to report decreasing
headcount figures. At the same time, we have not seen signs
of further adjustment in market services thus far. In 2007
Q4, employment figures continued to drop in the public
sector.
Overall, we can conclude that declining employment is
largely due to insufficient labour demand as the rising
tightness indicator of the previous period is primarily
attributable to the shrinking number of reported
vacancies.
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Chart 1-19
Changes in employment
(seasonally adjusted, quarterly data)
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Composition of unemployment
(quarterly data, Public Unemployment Service)
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Development of tightness indicator and their
components 
(seasonaly adjusted quarterly data)
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Changes in activity, employment and
unemployment 
(seasonally adjusted quarterly changes, LFS)
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In 2008 Q1, consumer price inflation was 6.9 per cent, while
core inflation reached 5.2 per cent.
13
Compared to the
previous quarter, the two indices decreased and increased by
0.2 and 0.6 percentage points, respectively.
14
Monthly changes indicate that the disinflation process has
begun, but is materialising rather slowly. The disinflation
process may be attributed to decelerating inflation in
processed food, while inflation in manufactured goods and
services, in relation to the increasing energy prices,
accelerated.
Slow disinflation
The international inflation environment continued to
deteriorate last quarter. While the price level of certain
unprocessed foods has corrected somewhat, international
energy prices continued to rise. Because of this, consumer
inflation even in developed countries has reached a peak
unsurpassed in the last several years, which can be largely
attributed to energy and food price increases in the previous
periods. Nevertheless, the acceleration of the consumer
price index in developed countries is basically associated
with the direct impact of energy and food products; for the
other product groups acceleration so far has been
negligible.
15
Trend inflation in Hungary in 2008 Q1 increased somewhat
compared to the previous quarter, and reached 6 per cent.
Monthly data suggest, however, that a decline has finally
started to materialise.
The reason behind the drop in core inflation is slower
inflation in prices of processed foods. This reduction,
however, seems to be rather slow. In fact, it halted in March
and April. The reduction in inflation for the same product
group is also occurring slowly in the euro area, though it is
somewhat faster than in Hungary.
16
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Chart 1-23
Consumer price index and core inflation
(seasonally adjusted, annualised data)
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Chart 1-24
Inflation trend*
(seasonally adjusted, annualised data)
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1.3  Inflation developments
* Core inflation calculated by the MNB, excluding the effect of changing
indirect taxes and medical visit fee.
13 The core inflation prognosis regularly published in the Report can be compared to the core inflation calculated by the MNB, which was 5.6 per cent in 2008 Q1.
14 In April, the consumer price index was 6.6 per cent, the core inflation was 5.6 per cent.
15 For details, see to Box 1-2.
16 The question that may arise as to the degree that inflation in the price of processed foods in Hungary moves in tandem with that in the euro area. In the pre-accession
era, the co-movement of the two time series was weak. From mid-2004 we expected them to move in closer conjunction, because accession accelerated the EU
integration of the Hungarian food market. Inflation in the price of processed food was lower in Hungary than in the euro area till the beginning 2006, however, from
then on, it was well above it. The former was attributable to EU accession, which reduced import prices over the short term. The latter was due to fiscal adjustments
in 2006 and a sharper rise in energy prices in Hungary during 2007.
Obviously, there is a correlation between the inflation in
processed food prices and the change of commodity prices;
therefore it is worth looking at the consumer price changes in
unprocessed foods and agricultural producer price changes.
The price level of the unprocessed foods product group was
highly stable in 2008 Q1, while agricultural producer prices,
as a whole, were on the rise even though a decline was
experienced as early as February in respect of some of these
products.
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Chart 1-25
Inflation of foods in Hungary and in the euro area
(seasonally adjusted, annualised quarterly change)
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World market prices of crude oil and metals have been on the rise for
years, but from the middle and end of 2007 this process accelerated,
and was accompanied by a significant increase in the prices of food
commodities.
There are several factors which, even in combination, could have led to
soaring prices; but it is quite uncertain which of these factors
contributed the most. On the demand side, growing demand in
Eastern Asia may be an explanation. This factor should account for a
long-term, trend-like rise even in the future; on the other hand, it is
uncertain as to what extent it is responsible for the recent skyrocketing
of prices. Growing demand for food commodities could be justified by
their increased use for bio-fuel production. Bio-fuel production is
supported by state subsidies on the one hand, and production has
become more profitable due to the high crude oil prices. Nevertheless,
this factor may be temporary only as it could be terminated through
economic policy measures (revoking of subsidies). On the supply side,
bad weather may also have caused an increase in food commodity
prices, which is assumed to be temporary; on the other hand, global
climate changes render the development of extreme weather
conditions more probable.
As the prices of other commodities are also on the rise in addition to
food prices, it is likely that other factors may also have an impact and
their effect extends beyond just foods. Thus, as an alternative
explanation, an overly loose American monetary policy may also be
partly responsible for the recent increase in commodity prices.17
According to this argument, low interest rates stimulate reduced
commodity production and increased inventories on the supply side,
and investments in commodity products on the demand side, which
may have been exacerbated by the uncertainty on the securities
market. The impact on the supply side is due to the fact, that for low
interest rates a higher return can be expected if the production of
commodities is suspended in order to be sold later, at higher prices.
As commodity markets are priced in US dollar, several analysts pointed
out the weakening of the dollar as an underlying reason behind the rise
in prices. It is important to note however, that the rise in commodity
prices might have been observed also in euro terms, although the
magnitude was somewhat smaller.
Recent movements in consumer prices have reflected the increases in
commodity and food prices: global inflation has surged to a multi-year
high in the past few months. However, a broader range of product
groups have so far been unaffected by rising commodity prices. As a
consequence, core inflation, as measured by the consumer price index
excluding food and energy prices, has remained stable and has not
followed the sharp upward movements in headline inflation.
Box 1-2: What is behind the increase in international commodity prices?
17 Jeffrey Frankel: ‘The Effect of Monetary Policy on Real Commodity Prices’ in John Campbell, ed., Asset Prices and Monetary Policy, U. Chicago Press, 2007.
Inflation in manufactured goods prices has been on the rise
since October 2007, which has slowed down the decline in
inflation. Price changes for durables, whose monthly inflation
rate in the first three months of 2008 was significantly
positive, were major contributors. It has happened only once
since the introduction of the inflation targeting system,
between August and October 2006, as a result of significant
weakening in the forint exchange rate. The unusually large
rise in used car prices has a significant impact on the product
group, but if we exclude this impact, we can still easily prove
that, within durables, inflation was widespread in Q1. 
A further detail that slightly modifies the above is that, after
a 3-month increase, the prices of these products fell in April
again.
Presumably, the stronger inflation in manufactured goods
reflects cost shocks in general, and especially the cost
increasing effect of higher electricity producer prices early
this year, and the weakening of the exchange rate in the
second half of last year. As our analysis concludes, so far the
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Given, however, that monetary policy works with a lag, decision-makers
base their actions on inflation projections. In order to produce a
forecast, they need an indicator which is a good predictor of risks to
price stability. To this end, a number of central banks, including the Fed,
the ECB, the Bank of England, the Bank of Canada, Sveriges Riksbank,
etc., use core inflation indicators. These are different from the headline
measure in that they permanently exclude from the CPI index one or
more components which exhibit significant variation but no clear trend
over the near term, and so they better reflect longer-term changes in
inflation. One of the most popular indicators is the core inflation
measure excluding food and energy prices, as already noted.
Removing some items from trend inflation may be justified by the fact
that shocks occur frequently in various product markets and the
correction of imbalances lasts longer than under average market
conditions. If, for example, a weak harvest lowers output in certain
agricultural products, prices will increase sharply, as supply shortages
cannot be compensated in short term. Presumably, such temporary
inflationary pressures will be offset by a counter shock at a later time –
perhaps the following year. Consequently, over a longer horizon, where
supply and demand return to balance on average, prices will be
determined by the dominant inflation rate. However, such events are
rare in the markets for manufactured goods, as goods typically are
produced at excess capacity, and so stockpiling may mitigate
mismatches between supply and demand. In such cases, core inflation
measures can be helpful in eliminating statistical ‘noise’ from data. It is
not optimal for a central bank to respond to every transient shock
affecting partial markets, which it will probably have to reverse shortly
afterwards.
As noted earlier, movements in the prices of items, which are not in the
core measure have followed a different pattern over recently: unlike in
earlier periods of high volatility, there has been a trend rise in the prices
of a number of commodities and foods. If these prices are determined
by persistent changes in relative prices or a generally overheated world
economy, rather than by temporary shocks, then the indexes excluding
them do not give a better prediction of future inflation developments.
On the contrary, food and commodity prices may be a leading indicator
of price rises spreading to a wider range of products.
Chart 1-26
World market price of commodities
(in USD, average of year 2000 = 100)
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Global and developed country inflation and core
inflation
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weaker forint exchange rate in February and March had a
negligible effect on the rising index of the first quarter, and
the consumer inflation of manufactured goods did not
increase in the euro area in the period under review.
In terms of quarter-to-quarter changes, market services
inflation has practically remained unchanged in 2008 Q1
compared to the previous quarter. This scenario will be
similar if the analysis is based on data of monthly frequency,
in which case it becomes apparent that in March the
annualised monthly price increase of market services reached
the upper extreme of the 5–7 per cent range typical of
previous years. In April, however, it returned to the middle
of this range.
In our November and February Reports we projected an
inflation path, in which at the beginning of 2008 and
particularly starting from the second quarter, inflation of
tradable goods and market services would rise temporarily as
a result of price shocks on the cost side.
18
The data of the first
quarter are largely in line with our expectations, whilst the
data of April slightly undermine our opinion about the size
and timing of the effect of the cost shocks and the effect of
lower consumption which counteracts such shocks.
Reviewing the correlation between some partial indices of
producer prices and consumer prices, we find, that based on
the experience of previous years, the increased prices of the
energy producing sectors have been passed through to
consumer prices of tradable goods and processed foods
through producer prices of the sectors producing for
secondary consumption, followed by those of the sectors
producing consumer goods.
19
Based on the producer price
indices available up to March 2008, the January increase in
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Chart 1-28
Inflation of manufactured goods
(seasonally adjusted, annualised monthly change)
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Chart 1-29
Inflation of market services
(seasonally adjusted, annualised monthly change)
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Chart 1-30
Producer and consumer price indices
(seasonally adjusted, yearly change)
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18 The increase in electricity prices at the beginning of the year represented a significant cost shock. Based on data received, our previous estimate of a 20-per cent
corporate electricity price increase was conservative, and it must have been somewhat higher. The precise value is not known; the producer prices of electricity
published by the CSO do not separate the energy prices provided to households and public institutions, where prices increased less steeply than for corporate energy
prices. In addition, the fact that a part of companies use household energy (small consumers under 3*50A) poses a further difficulty in the estimation of the exact size
of relevant corporate cost increase.
19 The use of the consumer price index of tradable goods and processed foods is justified by the fact that market services do not have a corresponding producer price,
and therefore we do not include them in the group of core inflation products.
energy prices was followed by an increase in the producer
price index of sectors producing for secondary consumption,
which thus far has been reflected only moderately in the
consumer prices of tradable goods and processed foods.
Consequently, we believe that the increase of producer
electricity prices may have a more pronounced impact on
consumer prices in the next few months.
Other items with an inflation increasing effect
In 2008 Q1, vehicle fuel prices compared to the previous
quarter and to the same period of last year increased by 4.6
and 18.1 per cent, respectively. The higher prices resulted
from the increase in world market prices for crude oil.
While budgetary adjustments indirectly promoted disinflation
on the demand side, the government sector continued to
contribute to price growth above the long-term inflation
target through the pricing within its scope of authority. In
2008 Q1, regulated prices increased by 6.9 per cent compared
to the same period of last year. Inflation in this product group
was influenced by contradictory effects: during 4 quarters,
household energy prices and the prices of goods regulated by
local governments increased by at least 10 per cent or more,
while the overall price increase of the product group was
mitigated by the less than 1 per cent and the 2.3 per cent
annual increase of the prices of telecommunication services
and pharmaceuticals, respectively.
Moderation in inflation expectations
The 12-month forward-looking inflation expectations of
households decreased somewhat with respect to the previous
quarter, similarly to the development of perceived inflation
in the last 12 months. One positive development is that
households’ expected inflation decreased significantly for the
first time since 2007 Q2, but the fact remains that
expectations are at historically high levels.
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Chart 1-31
Houshold inflation expectations*
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2  Financial markets

Over the past few months, sentiment on the global financial
markets has continued to be influenced by the impact of the
US sub-prime crisis on financial institutions and its potential
consequences for the real economy. Tightening credit
conditions suggest that the adverse impact of the crisis will
take longer to wear off. This is reflected in the fact that both
investment banks and supranational institutions have revised
down their projections for economic growth. Nonetheless, an
increasing number of analyses and public statements claim
that uncertainty about further losses and impacts has
decreased, and the worst of the crisis is over in the largest
economies.
From the perspective of the prevailing sentiment in the global
markets, the time since our last Report can be divided into
two sub-periods based on changes in indicators measuring
investors’ risk tolerance. Before end-March, investors’ risk
appetite decreased and credit spreads widened; whereas in
April and May optimism seemed to return to the markets.
This is reflected in a decrease in risk indices and credit
spreads, and also in the appreciation of the currencies of
developing countries.
Although losses suffered by investment banks continued to be
disclosed, in many cases this did not lead to falling share
prices. This, in turn, suggests that investors are putting more
emphasis on the declining uncertainty in future profitablity
than on the unfavourable impacts of the specific announced
losses. The major central banks launched further instruments
of liquidity provision to ease the tension that had been
mounting in the inter-bank money market since the summer
of 2007. Furthermore, a second instance of institution-
specific intervention occurred: following the precedent of the
Bank of England with Northern Rock, the Federal Reserve
took an active role in the rescue of Bear Stearns, one of the
largest investment banks in the US. This is a clear indication
that the central banks in advanced economies are willing to
heavily commit themselves to maintaining financial system
stability.
Low liquidity and lack of confidence persisted in the inter-
bank market. As a result, the difference between inter-bank
interest rates and government yields of equal maturities rose
close to historical peaks in both EUR and USD. However,
while the rise last summer and last December was
unequivocally due to banks’ growing demand for liquidity
and their lack of confidence in each other, according to many
analysts, this year’s increase is largely attributable to concerns
about solvency. Low risk appetite is reflected in the fact that
in early March, demand for government securities of euro
area countries fell, with the exception of Germany. This
decline in demand manifested itself in unusually wide spreads
compared to the benchmark German securities, and the
drying up in the markets in a number of the cases.
The US Federal Reserve lowered its target rate by 75 basis
points in mid-March, then by another 25 in late April; the
last time the Fed funds target stood at the current level of 2
per cent was in the final months of 2004. Although markets
have, over the past two months, priced in further rate cuts
before the end of 2008, currently they expect no further
monetary easing. The statement after the last rate-setting
decision also seems to corroborate this: downside risks to
growth were not mentioned, and the references to further
potential rate cuts, typical to previous statements, were
replaced with neutral wording. In response, the US dollar,
following a historical low on 22 April, had appreciated by
approximately 3 per cent against the euro by mid-May.
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Chart 2-1
Changes in risk indicators*
* Indicators reflecting spreads on EUR-denominated debt in a breakdown
by credit rating.
Source: JPMorgan.
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Chart 2-2
The Fed funds target rate, the 3-month USD 
inter-bank and government bond yields
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The outlook for growth in Europe remains much more
favourable than growth prospects overseas; but the
slowdown due to tightening credit conditions and the euro
appreciating close to historical highs has been more
conspicuous over the past few months. Although the
European Central Bank has also revised its growth projection
downwards, the central bank’s communication, which
consistently stresses inflation risks, put an end to
expectations of further rate cuts. The market now expects
tightening to be a more likely scenario before the end of the
year. It was the first time that, in their joint communication,
the G7 countries warned of extreme foreign exchange rate
volatility. In response, certain market participants anticipated
a joint foreign exchange market intervention by the Fed and
the ECB, which did not occur.
While the central banks of advanced economies ponder the
relative risks of the economic downturn in the wake of the
credit crisis, and inflation fuelled by high food and oil prices,
their counterparts in the emerging countries are also facing
the problem of a rise in expected risk premium. As a
consequence, the majority of the central banks in emerging
economies tightened their monetary policies along with the
simultaneous rise in commodity and food prices, and risk
premia.
This process was also observed in the CEE region. The policy
rate was increased by 25 basis points in Poland in February
and March, and markets have priced in further monetary
tightening. A 25 basis point tightening occurred in the Czech
Republic in February, with the base rate now at 3.75 per cent.
Although this is a peak for many years, the Czech Republic is
the only country in the EU where the key policy rate is below
that of the ECB. In Slovakia, the central bank left the base rate
unchanged. According to expectations, the country will be
approved for Eurozone membership by ECOFIN, after the
positive assessment of the European Commission.
In February and early March, when global sentiment was
subdued, most high yield currencies showed weakening. The
Icelandic króna suffered the heaviest blow, depreciating by
25 per cent since the beginning of the year. Despite this, the
national currencies of most countries in the CEE region
appreciated, with the exception of the forint, which, before
mid-March, moved in closer conjunction with the Turkish
lira and, to a lesser extent, with the South African rand and
the Brazilian real. The forint’s detachment from the regional
currencies is likely to have been due, in part, to the fact that
S&P changed the rating outlook for Slovakia and Poland to
positive, Fitch upgraded the Czech Republic, whereas S&P
changed its outlook for Hungary’s sovereign debt to negative.
One promising development is that the Hungarian currency
has been moving more closely together with the currencies in
the region, in particular with the zloty, since the end of
March.
Deterioration in the risk assessment of emerging markets and
the decline in investors’ risk appetite were reflected in a sharp
increase in credit default swap (CDS) prices before mid-
March. The prices of these derivatives, which provide
coverage against default on sovereign bonds of a given
country, rose more sharply in Hungary than in any other
country in the region, and exceeding the CDS spreads of
Mexico and Russia, reached those of Bulgaria, Brazil and
Estonia. Since mid-March, simultaneously with improvement
in global sentiment, CDS prices have fallen significantly, the
Hungarian spread continues to move in tandem with those of
Brazil and Estonia.
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION • MAY 200832
Chart 2-3
The ECB’s base rate, the 3-month EUR inter-bank and
government bond yields
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
Ja
n
. 
0
6
M
ar
. 
0
6
M
ay
 0
6
Ju
ly
 0
6
S
ep
. 
0
6
N
o
v.
 0
6
Ja
n
. 
0
7
M
ar
. 
0
7
M
ay
 0
7
Ju
ly
 0
7
S
ep
. 
0
7
N
o
v.
 0
7
Ja
n
. 
0
8
M
ar
. 
0
8
M
ay
 0
8
Per cent
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
Per cent
3-month interbank deposit 3-month treasury bill
ECB policy rate
Chart 2-4
Exchange rates of currencies in the region
(1 February 2008= 0)* 
* Positive values denote appreciation against the euro.
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The MNB and the Hungarian government decided to abolish
the EUR/HUF exchange rate fluctuation band effective as of
26 February 2008. Markets responded favourably to the
announcement, the forint appreciated. As the exchange rate
was well within the band at the time of the decision, analysts’
expectations have remained fundamentally unchanged. For
the time being, surveys on analysts’ expectations do not point
to exchange rates that are outside the former band, and, after
the turbulence in early March, options-implied volatility has
also returned to levels prior to the abandonment of the
fluctuation band.
A few days after the announcement about the exchange rate
band, together with a marked rise in government bond yields,
the forint suffered a substantial weakening. However, relative
to the rise in interest rates along the yield curve, the
depreciation of the forint was only moderate. Since mid-
March, the forint has strengthened again by a robust 5 per
cent. This trend was only temporarily halted by news of the
crisis of the government coalition.
There are several underlying reasons for the stability of the
exchange rate of the forint, labelled as surprising by many,
over the past two months. In all likelihood, a recent marked
rise in yields of forint-denominated assets has not only made
holding HUF instruments attractive, but also increased the
costs of taking up speculative positions against the forint. As
a result, investors who had previously opened such
speculative short HUF positions, may have decided to close
their positions, given the stability of the exchange rate. This
view is supported by the observed increase in non-residents’
open positions in HUF, and a decrease in their FX swap
holdings over the past two months.
As for events on domestic financial markets over the past few
months, the most important developments have been the
increase in government securities yields, and the subsequent
decline in the liquidity of the government securities market.
Government bond yields had been increasing at a steady pace
for some months when, in late February, unusual turbulence
emerged in the bond market, resulting in a fast rise in yields
and a temporary drying up of market liquidity. The increase
in interest rate swap (IRS) yields was more modest, which led
to an unusual widening of swap spreads. As a result, an
increasingly high amount of (unrealised) losses were incurred
on bonds accumulated by primary dealers over the previous
months, which were hedged by swap deals. Having reached a
certain level of losses, some participants had to close their
positions, which, in turn, led to further increases in bond
yields across the curve, further widening in swap spreads and
even scarcer liquidity.
There were several reasons underlying this disorderly market
situation, which mutually reinforced one another. Non-
residents could not encumber their balance sheets with
Hungarian government securities despite the high yields,
whereas the lack of demand by domestic pension funds was
mostly due to their legal obligation to rearrange their
portfolios towards equity holdings. The pressure eased with
a new issuance scheme of ÁKK (the Government Debt
Management Agency), which replaced a part of long maturity
issuances with shorter-term debt, thereby decreasing the
supply of longer maturity bonds. From mid-March yields
started to fall significantly, except for one transient instance
of increase in response to news of the possible break-up of
the coalition government in late March; even so, they were
well above pre-February levels. Although there has been a
marked reduction in swap spreads as well, yields on
government securities continue to exceed inter-bank market
yields (BUBOR, FRA, IRS), thus we believe that even shorter-
term government securities contain some liquidity premium
and, therefore, are likely to give an upwardly biased estimate
of the expectations for the key policy rate. According to our
market information, liquidity in the bond market is still
below pre-turbulence levels.
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Chart 2-5
Developments in CDS premia in some emerging
countries
0
100
200
300
400
Ja
n
. 
0
6
M
ar
. 
0
6
M
ay
 0
6
Ju
ly
 0
6
S
ep
. 
0
6
N
o
v.
 0
6
Ja
n
. 
0
7
M
ar
. 
0
7
M
ay
 0
7
Ju
ly
 0
7
S
ep
. 
0
7
N
o
v.
 0
7
Ja
n
. 
0
8
M
ar
. 
0
8
M
ay
 0
8
Basis point
0
100
200
300
400
Basis point
Hungary Poland Turkey
Russia Mexico Brazil
Chart 2-6
Changes in the EUR/HUF exchange rate
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The MNB left its key policy rate unchanged in February;
while in March and April, it was raised by 50 and 25 basis
points, respectively. The central bank measures, the increase
in the risk premium and the deterioration in the perception
of inflation process resulted in a marked shift in the expected
future trajectory of the policy rate.
Short-term inter-bank yields have risen sharply since
February. While in early February the market expected a
fundamentally declining interest rate path, the current yield
curve suggests further monetary tightening for 2008. This is
also corroborated by surveys of market analysts. The surveys
also reveal that, although there is a general consensus that the
tightening cycle will continue over the short term,
expectations on the policy rate by the end of the year are
rather diverse, and some analysts are already convinced that
the central bank will cut the policy rate in the second half of
the year already.
In regard to monetary conditions, the real exchange rate has
changed only slightly since our last Report, there was a slight
real appreciation, as the nominal exchange rate of the forint
strengthened and inflation was also higher in Hungary than
in the euro area, although the latter was exceptionally high in
March. The real interest rate rose to close to 4 per cent, the
historical average, as the rise in the forward-looking 1-year
interest rate exceeded the increase in the inflation expected
for the next 1-year period.
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Chart 2-7
Trends in swap spreads since early 2008
(government bond yields – swap yields)
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Chart 2-9
Changes in monetary conditions
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Chart 2-8
MNB base rate expectations
Note: Estimated by the MNB from interbank money market interest rates,
using the spline technique.
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3  Inflation and real economic prospects

We adjusted our inflation forecast described in the February
Report upward, and thus inflation is expected to remain
above the mid-term target within the time horizon relevant
for the monetary policy (5–8 quarters). At the same time, if
our basic assumptions hold, over the longer run inflation may
sink to 3 per cent. With respect to consumer prices, we can
see upward risks because of a world economic environment
which may be potentially more unfavourable than assumed in
the baseline scenario, and more retrospective inflation
expectations.
20
Our basic view regarding real economic prospects has
remained largely the same: we still forecast a slow
improvement in growth, which is characterised by a shift in
the growth structure towards domestic components. Certain
factors, however, point to a slightly higher baseline scenario
than before. Over the short term, stronger-than-expected
agricultural production activity and a modest adjustment of
government services, which is anticipated on the basis of the
initial indicators of the year, should cause somewhat more
robust growth than in the February Report.
21
In the longer
run, we anticipate higher real wages and household
consumption growth, partly because of slower corporate
wage adjustments, and partly because of the 2009 higher rise
in public real wages compared to February. While the rate of
economic growth is predicted to accelerate, on the whole, the
output gap over the entire time horizon will be negative.
Despite the quantitatively slightly more favourable baseline
scenario, downward risks have strengthened due to the world
economic environment, which may be more unfavourable
than previously expected.
As the wage minimum for skilled workers increased at the
beginning of the year, we expect a slower wage-adjustment
compared to the second half of last year. Higher wages will
deteriorate the companies’ profits, and would force them to
more drastic price increases and employment cuts than
anticipated. Combined with higher wage dynamics, rising oil
prices and agricultural commodity prices as well as growing
imported inflation have contributed to a slower-than-
expected disinflation process, while the negative output gap
works against the spreading of cost shocks.
Slowly recovering economy
The driving force behind economic growth in 2007 was net
export, which represented a major part of GDP growth. Over
the forecast horizon, however, a gradual shift is anticipated
towards domestic demand components, while net export
contribution to growth will continuously shrink. Sagging
international economic activity will lead to a decline in
Hungarian export dynamics which, in turn, will result in
weaker net export. In addition, the gradually improving
domestic demand will result in growing import.
In terms of domestic demand components, we anticipate a
slow recovery in consumption and investment during the
periods ahead, and, with the deceleration of the rate of fiscal
adjustment, government sector services are expected to
decline less and to grow moderately after that. Higher wage
dynamics than expected in February increase the real income
of households even despite the more drastic employment cuts
and price increases of companies, which is reflected by more
intense consumption growth. Nevertheless, on the whole we
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3.1  Baseline scenario
Chart 3-1
GDP growth and contributions
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20 The projections were pepared on the basis of infromation available up to 17:00, the 16th of May.
21 In this conclusion, we took into account the fact that the volume indicators calculated by the OEP (National Health Insurance Fund) for health care services showed
some adjustment in the first quarter. In addition, considering the expenditure side of government services the abolition of the medical visit fee and the tuition fee
will increase the output of the government sector.
still believe that households will spend only a part of their
increased real income on excess consumption, and thus their
willingness to save will increase. Due to decreasing
employment, the uncertainty of anticipated earnings will rise
and household loan margins are expected to increase
gradually.
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Between 2001 and 2006, the Hungarian economy experienced a
growth in excess of 4 per cent on an average basis, but by the end of
this period, the government had accumulated an unsustainable
amount of fiscal deficit. In view of the relative stability of past
economic growth, our previous estimation did not indicate a
significant positive output gap for this period. Thus, the question
arises as to what extent our previous estimations have been accurate,
as the unsustainable budgetary and external balance should indicate,
from an economic point of view, that the capacity utilisation of the
economy is too high, and the output gap is positive.22 This suspicion
has been confirmed by other factors. On the one hand, adverse
structural changes (constant labour market interventions, increasing
marginal tax burdens) in the past few years in the Hungarian economy
may, theoretically, have decelerated the sustainable, potential growth
rate of the economy. On the other hand, last year we observed a
significantly stronger deceleration of the economic growth than we
expected, which, again, may be an indication that in the adjustment
position the magnitude of factors retracting to the trend of growth
(such as excess demand in the labour and goods markets), thus the
output gap, was smaller than we had earlier thought.
The purpose of our current analysis is to quantify this, for which reason
we have updated all of our methods we use for potential output
estimations.23 This primarily resulted in the re-estimation of parameters
for time series methods. Moreover, for the production function-based
assessment approach, we reviewed all previous and current
information available on the level of production variables. As a result,
we have arrived at a somewhat different conclusion regarding our view
of the capital stock.
According to our previous practice, the level of capital stock was
calculated on the basis of the further deduction of a capital estimation
described in a previous MNB Background Study,24 however, the time
series used for that calculation were only available up to 2002. During
the re-estimation process of potential GDP, we re-estimated the capital
stock for the corporate and government sectors on the basis of the
gross fixed capital formation data obtained from the CSO in more
details and covering a longer period of time. The re-estimation of capital
stock resulted in a more accurate sectoral (corporate or government)
and asset type breakdown (investments in machinery or building). Our
results are summarised on the chart below.
Our new estimation shows several differences compared to our
previous results: on the one hand, our current result indicates that
before 2000, capital stock expansion was faster than we assumed
earlier, both for the government and the corporate sectors. On the other
hand, from 2003 onward, capital accumulation was more intensive in
the government sector; and from 2005 the accumulation of corporate
capital stocks decelerated even more drastically than observed earlier.
As a result of these impacts, several significant conclusions can be
drawn from our new capital stock estimation with regard to potential
GDP growth: on the one hand, up to 2001, capital expansion
contributed to economic growth to a greater extent than assumed
earlier; on the other hand, from 2001 onward government investment
had a significantly stronger impact on capital expansion than the
growth of production investments in the corporate sector.
Box 3-1: Output gap and potential growth in Hungary – our current results
22 The GDP effect of fiscal expansion is analysed in Hornok-Kiss-Jakab (2008) "Fiscal Expansion and Macroeconomic Processes", MNB Bulletin, April.
23 For further details see Szilárd Benk–Zoltán M. Jakab–Gábor Vadas: Potential Output Estimations for Hungary: a Survey of Different Approaches (MNB Background
Studies, 2005).
24 For further details on capital stock estimation, see Gábor Pula: Capital Stock Estimation in Hungary with the PIM Method: A Brief Description of Methodology and
Results (MNB Working Papers, 2003).
Chart 3-2
Comparison of the capital expansion figures of
our new and previous capital stock estimation
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As a consequence of the more unfavourable international
economic outlook, increasing corporate loan margins, and
the more unfavourable corporate profitability than in
February, our view of corporate investment has grown more
pessimistic. This view is reinforced by the stagnating level of
sectoral confidence indicators (industry, services, trade,
construction) too.
On the whole, however, we still expect a gradual recovery in
corporate investment over the entire forecast horizon,
resulting from the combined effect of acceleration in sectors
producing for the domestic market and in the real estate
sector, and of deceleration in export sector activities.
Growing EU funds may also contribute to the recovery in
investment, but the extent to which they generate unplanned,
extra investment remains to be seen.
In 2008, a slow recovery is expected in investment related to
the government, primarily due to infrastructure-type
investment financed by European Union funds. However,
with regard to sectors considered strictly government-related
(administration, education, health care) we project stagnation
for 2008. Overall, investments related to the government,
primarily construction-type investments have a more negative
outlook for 2008 than expected earlier. This is confirmed by
poor confidence indicators and by the still declining stock of
orders in the construction. At the same time, however,
government-related gross fixed capital formation may be
more extensive in 2009, due to more efficient utilisation of
European Union funds.
In 2007, social benefits dropped considerably. The drop was
caused by a change in statistical methodology on the one
hand (input side accounting replaced by output side
accounting), and by the fiscal adjustment on the other hand.
In 2008, the decline in social benefits is expected to be much
less steep. The change of methodology will not affect the
data, and the abolition of medical visit fees and hospital per
diem fees may result in a growing volume of public health
care services.
Companies may counterbalance the slower
deceleration of wage increases by lower
employment and higher price increases
In view of the anticipated macro-economic processes, the
adjustment process on the labour market has a major impact
on both inflation and growth prospects. In all of our
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In view of our new results and based on our additional methods, the
potential growth rate of the economy significantly has decelerated in
the last few years.25 As opposed to the 4 per cent potential growth that
was observed, and had been estimated by us also, for the first few years
following the year 2000, all of our current methods indicated, that in
2007 the potential growth was definitely below 4 per cent, and in fact,
based on the consensus it should have been around 3 per cent. It is
important to note, that economic growth from 2004 onward has
gradually exceeded its potential growth rate, i.e. the output gap turned
positive, and the expansive fiscal policy prevailing at the time probably
had a decisive impact on this process. The balance improving measures
of the previous year combined with additional, one-off effects,
considerably slowed down the growth of GDP during 2007, thus the
previously positive output gap turned negative, which, on the demand
side, limited the possibility of reflecting the increased costs of the
previous year in the prices (the size of the output gap is shown on
Chart 3–3).
In view of our current projection, Hungarian economic growth will be
smaller than its potential rate this year, and an initial narrowing of the
output gap cannot be anticipated until 2009, which is expected to still
remain negative over our entire forecast horizon. At the same time, our
analysis draws attention to the fact that the stalling of Hungarian
economic growth in the past few years was influenced not only by
demand side factors (balance improving fiscal arrangements), but also
by issues related to the deceleration of the longer-term growth trend.
25 With regard to our results it is important to note that nearly all the methods we use include, in some form, trend filtering procedures. The uncertainty of these
procedures have a particularly significant effect on the end points of the time series. In order to mitigate this risk we extended the time series (e.g. by using
projections); however, the evaluation of 2007 data might still be subject to a potential revision.
Chart 3-3
Growth of actual and potential GDP in Hungary
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projections published since the announcement of the fiscal
austerity measures, we have consistently anticipated that the
companies would attempt to compensate their deteriorating
profits by stricter behaviour regarding wages. We could in
fact see the first signs of this last year, through decelerating
bonus payments. However, data for the first few months of
this year appear to support a somewhat different adjustment
mechanism than previously expected, in which employment
cuts play a more significant role, while the increase in wages
can be still considered strong and presumably even
accelerating, due to the minimum wage increases.
The wage behaviour and labour market activity of the private
sector continue to be influenced by pressure to improve the
significantly deteriorated profit levels of last year, slowly
recovering domestic economic activity, drastically increasing
commodity and energy costs, and administrative measures
related to tax increases and the increase in the minimum
wage for skilled workers. Obviously, the priority of these
factors is different for each sector.
Despite the international financial turbulences, productivity
growth in the manufacturing industry remained dynamic in
the first few months of the year. Even though the initial data
of the year appear favourable, in view of the slackening
European economy, since mid-2008, we expect decelerating
performance for the sector, which may result in more drastic
labour market adjustments from 2009. Decelerating
disinflation is anticipated to result in a slow decline in wage
inflation over the entire forecast horizon, but for
manufacturing companies this will be in line with the
productivity developments throughout the period, thus
significant inflation pressure will probably not be generated
by this sector. 
The beginning of the year witnessed a dynamic outflow of
wages in the service sector. The changes to the minimum
wage had a stronger-than-expected wage-increasing impact
which, combined with the slower disinflation process,
resulted in slower wage adjustments at the companies in the
sector throughout the entire year, to be counterbalanced with
higher prices and employment cuts. From 2009 on, we
forecast more dynamic growth in domestic demand, leading
to improved profitability of service providers. In addition to
improving profitability prospects employment figures may
increase, while the decline of wages may continue at a slower
rate than previously expected.
Based on the magnitude of changes, labour market
developments taking place last year in a few less prominent
sectors (e.g. agriculture, construction) had a significant
impact on our view regarding the entire private sector. After
construction and agricultural production bottomed out in
2007, looking ahead over our forecast horizon we anticipate
a gradual recovery for both these sectors, which will be
characterised by a reversal in the decline in workforce
numbers, and by more dynamic wage increases.
On the whole, we anticipate larger wage increases for the
private sector than we had forecasted earlier. This is largely
due to the minimum wage increases at the beginnig of the
year, but the more adverse inflation environment also
contributes. The declining of employment in the sectors
producing for the domestic market can continue this year,
although we expect significant employment cut in the
manufacturing industry only in the next years.
This year the government sector may see an end in the
employment reduction which has rised since 2006, and we
do not anticipate further employee cuts from 2009 onward.
However one new aspect compared with our projection in
February is that we expect a 3 percentage point higher wage
dynamic in 2009 regarding the average wage in the
government sector.
Slower disinflation
If our basic assumptions prove to be correct, over the time
horizon of the 5-8 quarters relevant for monetary policy,
inflation may remain above 3 per cent, the mid-term target of
the central bank. On the longer run, however, the consumer
price index may sink to the target level, and reach 6.3 per
cent, 4.2 per cent and 3.0 per cent in 2008, 2009 and 2010,
respectively, according to our basic projection.
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Chart 3-4
Components of unit labour costs and profits realised
on labour in the private sector
(annual index)
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In the baseline scenario, the main determining factors of the
disinflation process have remained the same. On the one
hand, inflation pressure will decline if our assumption
regarding international commodity prices proves to be
correct, i.e. increases in oil prices come to a halt and a slight
adjustment takes place for foods during the second half of
2008 as well. On the other hand, the output gap is negative
for the entire forecast horizon, which may force more
moderate wage dynamics and more subdued price increases
compared to costs.
Since forward commodity prices have proved to be very
inaccurate forecast indicators in the last period, we attribute
greater significance to the relevance of the risk paths than we
did in our projections in the past few years, which reflect the
vulnerability of the disinflation process.
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Chart 3-5
Contribution of certain product groups to the rise in
the consumer price index
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Other Unprocessed food
Processed food Primary effects
of government measuresEnergy
Weight 2008 2008 2008 2008 2009 2009 2009 2009 2010 2010 2010 2010
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Unprocessed food 5.8 13.8 11.2 6.0 0.8 0.9 1.4 2.1 2.9 4.2 5.6 6.3 6.3
Vehicle fuel 7.1 14.8 12.7 11.3 6.3 2.3 -1.1 -1.9 –0.6 -1.0 -1.0 -0.8 -0.7
Regulated prices 21.1 6.9 7.0 8.1 9.6 9.2 8.6 7.3 5.5 4.0 3.3 3.2 3.1
Core inflation 66.0 5.6 5.3 5.1 4.5 4.1 4.0 3.6 3.3 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.0
Consumer price index 100 6.9 6.6 6.2 5.5 4.8 4.4 3.9 3.4 3.1 2.9 2.9 2.9
Table 3-1
Baseline scenario of the inflation forecast
In keeping with our long-established forecasting practice, we have
prepared a conditional prognosis. For our basic assumptions we applied
a fixed monthly average EUR/HUF and EUR/USD exchange rate, central
bank base rate and long-term yields for April, and considered the
average oil forward price path for April.
The base rate exceeds by 75 basis points, the EUR/HUF exchange rate is
slightly stronger than the one used in the last quarter. The current oil
price path in US dollars is around 20 per cent higher than indicated by
our February assumption. The higher oil price path increases fuel prices,
producer and market energy prices, and may result in increased
regulated energy prices.
Based on the current data, futures prices and the projections of
international institutions, we expect that agricultural commodity prices
will increase faster than earlier. In line with this, however, we continue to
assume a sharp adjustment in the baseline scenario in the second half of
2008. We considered the potential continuation of the commodity price
increases observed in the last period as a risk scenario. 
Box 3-2: Our assumptions
Chart 3-6
Changes in our agricultural producer price
forecast
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On the one hand the slower disinflation shown in the
baseline scenario is due to a higher projection of imported
inflation compared to the last Report. Here the increase of oil
price path has the highest impact, which rises the producer
costs, fuel prices and regulated prices as well. In addition the
slower deceleration in wage dynamics compared to February
increased our inflation forecast too.
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION • MAY 200842
Table 3-2
Changes in our basic assumptions compared to February*
February 2008 Current
2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010
Central bank base rate (per cent)** 7.5 7.5 - 8.25 8.25 8.25
HUF/EUR 256.0 256.0 - 255.2 253.8 253.8
USD/EUR (cent) 147.0 147.0 - 155.7 157.6 157.6
Brent oil price (USD/barrel) 90.9 88.3 - 106.4 106.3 103.8
Brent oil price (HUF/barrel) 15,819.0 15,368.0 - 17,414.5 17,112.8 16,721.6 
* Annual averages, based on the monthly average exchange rate in April 2008 and the crude oil futures price.
** End-of-year values.
* Energy related factors (fuel, producer and market energy), agricultural producer prices, other import prices.
** Methodological factors (abolition of medical visit fee and tuition fee, revision of cost factors data).
Changes since February
2008 2009
Labour market (unit laour cost) 0.2 0.4
Imported inflation* 0.5 0.3
Regulated prices 0.0 0.4
Other** -0.3 -0.5
Total 0.4 0.6
Table 3-3
Changes in the inflation forecast
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2007 2008 2009 2010
Actual Projection
February Current February Current February Current
Inflation (annual average)
Core inflation1 6.0 5.2 5.1 3.6 3.7 x 3.0
Consumer price index 8.0 5.9 6.3 3.6 4.2 x 3.0
Economic growth
External demand (GDP-based)** 3.8 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.3 x 2.3
Impact of fiscal demand2 -3.6 x -1.5 x -0.1 x -0.8
Household consumption -2.1 0.0 0.3 1.3 1.6 x 3.1
Memo: Household consumption expenditure -0.3 x 0.6 x 1.8 x 3.1
Fixed capital formation 1.0 3.5 3.2 5.1 5.1 x 6.8
Domestic absorption -0.2 0.8 1.3 2.7 2.9 x 3.8
Export 14.1 10.5 10.8 9.6 9.4 x 10.6
Import3,* 12.2 9.4 9.8 9.5 9.3 x 11.0
GDP*** 1.3 2.0 (2.2) 2.2 (2.4) 3.0 (2.8) 3.2 (3.0) x 3.7
Current account deficit3,*
As a percentage of GDP 5.0 x 4.9 x 4.8 x 4.8
EUR billions 5.1 x 5.3 x 5.5 x 6.0
External financing requirement3,*
As a percentage of GDP 4.0 x 3.4 x 2.8 x 2.5
Labour market
Whole-economy gross average earnings4 8.0 6.8 8.8 5.2 6.5 x 6.7
Whole-economy employment5 -0.1 -0.6 -1.4 -0.4 0.1 x 0.4
Private sector gross average earnings6 9.1 (8.2) 7.8 (7.1) 9.0 (8.2) 6.8 7.2 x 6.8
Private sector employment5 1.2 -0.6 -1.1 -0.6 0.0 x 0.5
Private sector unit labour cost5, 7 8.1 3.4 4.2 2.7 3.9 x 3.5
Household real income -3.3 1.3 1.5 1.7 2.4 x 2.7
Table 3-4
Changes in our projections compared to February 2008
1
For technical reasons, this indicator may temporarily differ from the index published by the CSO; over the long term, however, it follows a similar
trend. 
2
Calculated from the so-called augmented (SNA) balance; a negative value means a narrowing of aggregate demand.
3
As a result of uncertainty in the measurement of foreign trade statistics, from 2004 the actual import figure and current account deficit/external
financing requirement may be higher than suggested by official figures, or our projections based on such figures.
4
Calculated on a cash-flow basis.
5
According to the CSO LFS data.
6
According to the original CSO data, including the whitening effect. The numbers in brackets refer to wages excluding the effects of whitening and the
changed seasonality of bonuses.
7 Private sector unit labour cost calculated with a wage indicator excluding the effect of whitening and the changed seasonality of bonuses.
* Actual data for 2007 includes the impact of the Gripen purchase, which deteriorates the current account deficit and increases public consumption and
imports.
** MNB estimate.
*** The numbers in brackets refer to GDP growth not adjusted with calendar-day effect.
Our baseline projections describe the most probable outcome
on the basis of our basic assumptions and the current
information available to us. Obviously, various unforeseen
events may affect the economy, and we are also uncertain
about the macro-economic impacts of potential shocks. Of
the several alternative scenarios, in our analysis we pay
special attention to those which pose the highest risk to the
successful outcome of monetary policy. We highlighted three
risks in our current forecast. First, we believe it is possible
that world economic developments, and commodity and
food prices will prove to be even more unfavourable than we
can foresee. This would certainly have an adverse impact on
the Hungarian economy which is particularly vulnerable to
changes in the external environment. Second, even if the
adverse effects from the world economy do not deteriorate
any further, the temporarily unfavourable period may not
pass without consequences. Therefore, we are still highly
concerned that the inflation expectations in the baseline
scenario are more dependent on the high inflation levels
observed in the past than we had thought. Third, we should
note our uncertainty pertaining to the impact of the output
gap. The inflation-moderating effect of slowly growing
domestic demand will play an important role in the expected
decline of the currently high inflation. As we have no
experiences of the strength and size of this impact, we are
fairly uncertain about the outcome.
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3.2  Uncertainty of our forecast and risks
surrounding the baseline scenario
While fan charts are primarily used to illustrate the general uncertainty
surrounding the projection, the charting of alternative paths is one of
the most frequently used methods to display risks with a direct impact
on decision making. This is a very useful tool for examining the way the
projected baseline scenario will change for the specific period if the
most probable assumptions do not prevail.
Besides paying special attention to the indication of risks, some central
banks tracking inflation targets even prepare alternative risk scenarios
for their risk evaluation. In international practice, one group prepares
different risk scenarios in addition to their baseline scenario, while other
countries publish data only.
An example to the latter is the central bank of Slovenia, whose report
quantifies alternative paths, but does not illustrate them. It describes 7
scenarios altogether (e.g. increased oil prices, increased wages,
increased regulated prices), each of which analyses the upside risks. The
Czech central bank and Scandinavian central banks are among the
Box 3-3: Use of risk paths in international practice
Chart 3-7
Sample alternative paths
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Source: Swedish and Norwegian inflation reports, from February and March, respectively.
Uncertainty and risks surrounding the inflation
baseline scenario
The world economic environment has a substantial impact on
the inflation processes in Hungary. If oil prices increase at the
pace observed in the last few years, and there is no
adjustment to the food prices in the second half of the year,
these increases will pass through into domestic prices. To
illustrate the extent of the uncertainty surrounding this issue
we note that even the experts of international institutions
have yet to come to a uniform consensus regarding as much
as the expected direction of future price changes. We believe,
and our projections indicate, that the most likely scenario is
deceleration in price increases, but in our risk scenario we
have illustrated the potential outcome of such a scenario
where this adverse tendency does not come to a halt but
continues.
26
With respect to inflation developments we are strongly
concerned that recent price increases may lead to persistently
higher inflation expectations. If employees are not confident
that the inflation will decline to a level in line with price
stability, their wage demands will be based on the higher
inflation level observed. In this case, the nominal wage path
may deviate from the productivity growth, which may
pressure companies into accelerated price increases. 
In previous Reports, we have emphasised our doubts
regarding the output gap, indicating that the potential
outcome of the demand-reducing fiscal measures was still
shrouded by a considerable amount of uncertainty. It is hard
to estimate the extent to which corporate price formation
will be influenced by shrinking demand. Some signs also
indicate that the lower GDP path may be partly explained by
long-term factors on the supply side. In turn, the more
subdued dynamics of potential output mitigate the
disinflation effect. In this round we have reviewed our
measurements and projections for potential GDP (see the
relevant box), and we now believe that the inflation
consequences of lower growth are surrounded by
symmetrical risks which, however, renders our projection
more uncertain.
Uncertainty and risks surrounding the baseline
scenario of our growth forecast
Changes in the external demand represent a major source of
uncertainty regarding growth. The crisis originating in the US
mortgage market has amplified concerns related to mid-term
economic growth in Europe and the USA. It was published as
an alternative scenario that the financial assets devalued by
the re-priced risks may lead to smaller global demand
through their impact on wealth. At this time, we still consider
this risk scenario the most relevant with regard to Hungary’s
growth prospects, and we believe this path may result in a
lower GDP level than indicated in the baseline scenario.
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group of banks whose report contains a separate chart displaying
alternative scenarios in addition to the baseline. The Norwegian central
bank displays two alternative paths within the interest rate, output gap
and filtered CPI fan charts. Iceland also indicates two alternative
scenarios, which are further detailed in a 3-page box.
The most complex analysis of this kind is prepared by the Swedish central
bank, which indicates two different kinds of risks paths. The first analyses
the impact of potentially different monetary policies through the
modelling of a higher and a lower interest path, while the second is based
on different economic conditions (e.g. higher external inflation, higher oil
prices, higher wage increases). In a separate section, they emphasise that
the alternative risk paths which are based on higher inflation do not
necessarily mean that higher inflation has higher risks; their entire
inflation image is harmonious. They also stress that their results are
illustrations only, and several other alternative paths are conceivable.
26 This view is shared by the European Central Bank (ECB Monthly Bulletin 04/2008), the International Monetary Fund (IMF April WEO), and the European Commission
(EC spring forecast).
Chart 3-8
Inflation baseline scenario and risk paths
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Inflation and growth forecast fan chart 
On the whole, our inflation forecast is apparently jeopardised
by significant upward risks, which means that actual price
increases will more likely exceed our expectations, rather
than fall short of them. In terms of our growth projections,
we perceive some downward risk, primarily due to the
doubtful state of the global economic environment.
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Chart 3-9
Growth baseline scenario and risk paths
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Chart 3-10
Inflation forecast fan chart* 
* The fan chart represents the uncertainty surrounding the basic forecast.
The shaded areas cover a 90 per cent probability in total. The central,
darkest area containing the basic forecast for the consumer price index
(as the mode of distribution) indicated by the white dashed line covers
30 per cent of the probability. The continuous, horizontal line starting
from 2007 indicates the announced mid-term inflation target.
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Chart 3-11
GDP fan chart*
* The fan chart represents the uncertainty surrounding the basic forecast.
The shaded areas cover a 90 per cent probability in total. The central,
darkest area containing the basic forecast for the GDP (as the mode of
distribution) indicated by the white dashed line covers 30 per cent of the
probability.
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Inflation Expected inflation Expected inflation Expected inflation
with a 30 per cent probability with a 60 per cent probability with a 90 per cent probability
2008 6.2–6.4 6.0–6.6 5.8–6.9
2009 3.8–4.7 3.4–5.4 2.7–6.7
2010 2.6–3.9 2.1–4.9 1.2–6.8
Table 3-5
Bands of the inflation fan chart
In compiling this Report, as usual we studied the way our
projection would change if we applied the expectations for
the average exchange and interest rates, disclosed in the
Reuters survey, as our basic assumption. Analysts do not
envisage a significantly different exchange rate or base rate at
end-2008 from what is projected in the baseline forecast.
Assuming an unchanged exchange rate, they expect a 125
basis point rate cut by end-2009. These assumptions do not
entail any material change in either inflation or growth
projections.
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3.3  Background information used for our
forecast 
Chart 3-12
Exchange rate assumptions based on Reuters survey
prepared in April and fixed rate projection*
* Inverse scale.
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Chart 3-13
Central bank base rate assumptions based on
Reuters survey prepared in April and the fixed rate
projection
Fixed interest rate Expectations in Reuters survey
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2007 2008 2009 2010
Consumer Price Index (annual average growth rate, per cent)
MNB (May 2008) 8.0 6.3 4.2 3.0
Consensus Economics (April 2008)1 – 5.1 – 6.0 – 6.8 3.2 – 3.7 – 4.2 –
OECD (December 2007) 7.8 4.7 3.4 –
European Commission (Spring 2008) 7.9 6.3 3.7 –
IMF (April 2008) 7.9 5.9 3.5 –
Reuters-survey (April 2008)1 – 5.7 – 6.1 – 6.6 3.1 – 3.8 – 4.2 –
GDP (annual growth rate, per cent)
MNB (May 2008) 1.3 2.2 3.2 3.7
Consensus Economics (April 2008)1 – 1.5 – 2.1 – 2.7 2.5 – 3.2 – 3.6 –
OECD (December 2007) 1.8 2.6 3.8 –
European Commission (Spring 2008) 1.3 1.9 3.2 –
IMF (April 2008) 1.3 1.8 2.5 –
Reuters-survey (April 2008)1 – 1.7 – 2.1 – 2.7 2.5 – 3.0 – 3.5 –
Current account deficit (billion EUR/USD)
MNB (May 2008) (EUR)4 5.1 5.3 5.5 6.0
Consensus Economics (April 2008)1 (USD) – 3.9 – 6.9 – 8.9 4.5 – 6.9 – 9.5 –
Reuters-survey (April 2008)1 (EUR) – 4.5 – 4.9 – 5.5 4.4 – 5.0 – 5.7 –
Current account deficit (per cent of GDP)
MNB (May 2008)4 5.0 4.9 4.8 4.8
OECD (December 2007) 4.6 3.8 3.5 –
European Commission (Spring 2008) 5.0 4.4 3.9 –
IMF (April 2008) 5.6 5.5 5.1 –
Budget Deficit (ESA-95 method, per cent of GDP)
MNB (May 2008) 5.5 3.6 3.2 2.7
Consensus Economics (April 2008)1 – 3.7 – 4.0 – 4.7 3.2 – 3.8 – 6.0 –
OECD (December 2007) 6.4 4.3 3.5 –
European Commission (Spring 2008) 5.5 4.0 3.6 –
Reuters-survey (April 2008)1 – 3.7 – 4.0 – 4.7 3.2 – 3.8 – 6.0 –
Forecasts on the size of Hungary’s export markets
MNB (May 2008) 7.8 6.4 5.9 5.9
OECD (December 2007)2, 3 6.3 7.3 6.8 –
European Commission (Spring 2008)2 6.8 6.2 5.6 –
IMF (April 2008)2 5.9 4.9 4.8 –
Forecasts on the GDP growth rate of Hungary’s trade partners
MNB (May 2008) 3.8 2.5 2.3 2.3
OECD (December 2007)2, 3 3.5 2.6 2.5 –
European Commission (Spring 2008)2 3.7 2.7 2.3 –
IMF (April 2008)2 3.7 2.3 2.0 –
Table 3-6
MNB basic forecast compared to other forecasts
The projections of the MNB are ‘conditional’, which means that they cannot always be directly compared with the projections of other institutions.
1
For Reuters and Consensus Economics surveys, in addition to the average value of the analysed replies (i.e. the medium value), we also indicate the
lowest and the highest values to illustrate the distribution of the data.
2
Values calculated by the MNB; the projections of the institutions for the relevant countries are adjusted with the weighting system of the MNB, which
is also used for the calculation of the Bank’s own external demand indices. Therefore, these figures may deviate from the figures published by the
institutions.
3
Since the OECD did not publish any data on Romania, our OECD forecast excludes Romania.
4
Actual data for 2007 includes the impact of the Gripen purchase, which deteriorates the current account deficit and increases public consumption and
imports.
Source: Eastern Europe Consensus Forecasts (Consensus Economics Inc. (London), April 2008); European Commission Economic Forecasts (spring,
2008); IMF World Economic Outlook (April 2008); Reuters survey (April 2008); OECD Economic Outlook (December 2007).
4  General government and external balance

Relative to November 2007, there has been a slight shift in
our projection for the balance of the general government
towards a lower deficit. The difference is due to three factors.
First, a higher-than-projected wage path leads to an increase
in revenues from taxes and contributions. Second, for several
expenditure items,
27
in contrast with the former rule-based
projections, we accept the ceilings set by the government and
set forth in government resolutions, which means lower
expenditures. Finally, unlike the above factors, the fact that,
due to a substantial rise in the yield curve, a higher net
interest expenditure to points to a higher deficit path. 
A lower deficit path however is achieved by higher revenue
expenditure to GDP ratios.
The structure of the reduction in expenditures entails a
material rise in risks to longer-term sustainability. 
A reduction in the GDP-proportionate expenditure would
materialise mainly against the background of historically low
government capital expenditure and, according to
government plans, heavier reliance on EU funds. Thus,
further drastic fall in capital expenditure financed by
government funds can be expected. The low level and the
financing scheme of capital expenditure carry serious risks
shown in the fan chart of the fiscal deficit in the form of
asymmetric risk distribution suggesting a higher deficit.
Our baseline projection is for a 2008 fiscal deficit amounting
to approximately 3.6 per cent of GDP,
28
i.e. the deficit may
actually be lower than the deficit target set in the
Convergence Programme. We can no longer speak of
undershooting the deficit target in 2009 or 2010: our
baseline projection indicates that the deficit path outlined in
the Convergence Programme can be achieved only with strict
fiscal discipline and partial/complete freezing of the central
equilibrium reserve. In addition, our baseline scenario is
linked up with an asymmetric risk distribution suggesting a
higher deficit path over the entire length of the forecast
horizon, and as time passes, the likelihood of missing the
target increases. Based on our projection, unless primary
expenditures are reduced, there is no chance of any
substantial reduction in taxes.
The overall impact of fiscal demand in a broader sense points
to a reduction in the aggregate demand of the general
government over the forecast horizon, i.e. fiscal policy on the
demand side contributes to lower inflation. In addition to a
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4.1  Development of general government deficit
indicators
Preliminary Forecast
2007 2008 2009 2010
1. GFS balance -5.4 -4.0 -3.3 -2.9
2. of which: Central balance reserve* 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2
3. Primary balance -1.8 0.0 0.5 0.9
4. ESA balance adjustments -0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0
5. ESA balance → baseline forecast (1+4) -5.5 -3.6 -3.3 -2.9
6. Central balance reserve cancelled 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2
7. ESA balance → expected (5+6) -5.5 -3.6 -3.2 -2.7
8. Quasi fiscal and other adjustments -0.4 -0.9 -1.2 -0.9
9. Augmented (SNA) balance (5+8) -5.9 -4.5 -4.4 -3.6
10. Augmented (SNA) primary balance -2.3 -0.8 -0.6 0.1
11. Fiscal demand impact -3.6 -1.5 -0.1 -0.8
Note
ESA balance: Convergence programme 6.8 4.0 3.2 2.7
Table 4-1
Expected changes in fiscal deficit indicators
(as a percentage of GDP)
* Central equilibrium reserve planned by the government.
27 For the expenditures of budgetary units and chapters.
28 Unless the government decides on additional expenditures in the meantime, spending extra-revenues realised compared to the Convergence Programme.
reduction in the fiscal deficit, another determining factor of
future developments in the demand effect is a motorway
investment implemented under a PPP scheme. The marked
restriction on demand estimated to occur in 2010 is due to
the fact that the majority of motorway investments will have
been completed by 2010 Q2.
Based on the past 1.5 years of fiscal adjustment and our
assumption, it is safe to assume that a reduction in the deficit
in the first two years of adjustment was faster than the path
suggested in the Convergence Programme, due mainly to
higher-than-expected revenues. At the same time,
government expenditure was at least partly adjusted to higher
revenues. Therefore, it is true for the entire trajectory that
fiscal adjustment will materialise against a backdrop of higher
concentration of income and a higher level of redistribution
than was planned in the Convergence Programme.
29
From a forward-looking perspective, the strong rise in taxes
and contributions, which caused earlier sharp fall in the
deficit, will slow down, and the deficit will decline at a slower
rate and an assumed decrease in expenditures will play an
increasingly important role. In 2008, a strong reduction in
one-off items may have a significant role; however, it will
improve the fiscal balance less during the two years to follow.
We have prepared a conditional, but only partially rule-based
projection for 2009 and 2010. In our projection, we assume
that real wages in the public sector will grow according to
OKÉT (National Council for Public Service Interest
Reconciliation) agreement; the government will meet the
budget baselines it has worked out and approved and exercise
tight control over other expenditures. However, given the
above circumstances, expenditures are exposed to rather
asymmetric upside risks, which suggests that long-term
sustainability can be questioned.
2007: the first full year of adjustment – a fiscal
equilibrium better than described in the
Convergence Programme
In 2007, the fiscal deficit edged down to 5.5 per cent of GDP,
and thus the improvement in the balance exceeded the plans
in the Convergence Programme. The stronger-than-expected
decrease in the deficit was due, mainly, to a larger-than-
projected rise in revenues. Excess income was attributable to
slower wage adjustment in the private sector and the process
of ‘whitening’ in the case of several types of taxes, i.e. a rise
in the effective tax rates.
30
The 2007 deficit was lower (by 0.6 per cent of GDP) than our
projection in the November issue of the Report, which was
due predominantly to a robust rise in corporate taxes despite
slowdown in economic growth.
31
In addition, the fact that the
balance of the social security fund was more favourable than
expected
32
also promoted a decrease in the deficit, and due to
the decrease in purchase of goods and services, the local
government deficit was also lower than projected.
As regards 2007 trends, it is important to emphasise that the
general government headcount decreased faster than
expected, which facilitates a reduction in wage expenditures
over the longer term. Another favourable impact was the
larger-than-planned reduction in expenditures on drug
subsidy.
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Difference (percentage of GDP)
1. Profit taxes 0.2
2. Net expenditures of budgetary institutions 0.1
3. Balance of the social security funds 0.1
4. Balance of the local governments 0.1
5. GFS-ESA adjustments 0.1
6. Sum-total (1+2+3+4+5) 0.6
Table 4-2
Difference between the 2007 ESA balance and our November 2007 baseline projection 
29 Compared to the Convergence Programme elaborated in 2006, we forecast higher expenditures over the entire horizon. According to the original programme,
primary expenditures would have amounted to approximately 45.5% of GDP; based on preliminary data, the GDP-proportionate level of consolidated expenditures
was 1.0 basis point higher than this. Submitted to the European Commission this April, the report on the implementation of the Convergence Programme contained
a similar opinion on total expenditures between 2008-2010.
30 In 2007, in response to turning the grey economy into a legal one, income from contributions rose by approximately HUF 120 billion. A similar impact was exerted
on excise duties. As we consider this process to be permanent, we took it into account in our projection for revenues from taxes and contributions. 
31 Drawing on international experience, our projection is that business profits will fall at a rate exceeding the slowdown in growth. This assumption was not
corroborated by tax revenues however.
32 Developments in social security contributions and expenditures on medical and preventive care were more favourable in the last two months of 2007 than expected.
As a result of the adjustment, intra-annual spending was
smoother and thus the path of the usual intra-year
cumulation of the deficit was significantly different than in
previous years. At end-2007, spending by budgetary
institutions and expenditure expropriations under the
management of budgetary chapters (hereinafter: budgetary
organisations) was lower than intended by the government.
As a result, however, what is called the ‘the amount of carry
over’ was higher than optimum, which carries risks on the
expenditure side.
Expected development of revenues in 2008–2010
After a steep rise in revenues during the first eighteen months
of fiscal consolidation, our projection is more moderate over
the entire horizon in terms of GDP-proportionate revenues,
and, due to changes in the macro-economic environment, the
process may take longer than expected.
Tax revenues on consumption may be higher than estimated
in November 2007, based on the macro-economic
projection, steady growth in real consumption and higher
inflation. However, growth in nominal consumption was
lower than that in GDP at current prices, indirect tax to GDP
ratio will decline from 2008. This impact may reduce GDP-
proportionate tax revenues by an overall 0.5 to 0.6
percentage points between 2008 and 2010.
Compared to the projection in the November 2007 issue of
the Report, wages – another major source of revenues – may
grow faster over the entire time horizon.
Accordingly, revenues from contributions and income taxes
may be higher than previously projected. The most recent
projections for wage dynamics can be close to growth rate of
nominal GDP for the three years surveyed. Thus, GDP-
proportionate taxes related to wages will have decreased only
to a lower extent, by approximately 0.2 percentage points, by
2010. Such a favourable position is, however, unlikely to be
maintained over a longer term; as the favourable cyclical
position of wage dynamics slows growth, the GDP-
proportionate increase in the tax basis can be only
temporary.
Higher base effect of tax revenues from businesses (corporate
tax and business tax) are assumed for the entire forecast
horizon. This impact alone pushed up tax revenues by close
to 0.4 percentage points of GDP over the forecast horizon.
In respect of the revenues of municipalities, the local business
tax is of special importance. Exemptions related to this type
of tax was terminated at end-2007, therefore, the
municipalities that granted such exemptions in the past years
stand to realise revenue surplus, estimated to amount to
0.1–0.2 percentage points of GDP. If municipalities earn
surplus revenues that differ from our estimate, due to the
flexible adjustment of the sub-sector, this would modify the
balance of the sub-sector only slightly.
Overall, the adjustment has resulted in a sizeable extra
revenue for the budget relative to the Convergence
Programme. The majority of this surplus revenue was due to
stricter measures against tax evasion, and another part to
better-than-expected wage growth. Thus, the level of tax
burden is higher than planned and likely to remain so until
2010. As expenditures adjusted to higher revenues, this led to
the postponement of a reduction in revenues. The latter
aspect is especially dangerous, as the GDP-proportionate
erosion of taxes and contributions may result in the
deterioration of the fiscal position over the medium term
already.
Expenditure-side developments in 2008–2010
A reduction in the expenditure to GDP ratio of budgetary
organisations plays a decisive role in the projected level of
expenditure. A key component of the reduction in
expenditure is replacing own capital accumulation
expenditure with EU funds. Wage costs are unlikely to lead
to any further significant savings. The third key component
of expenditures, the purchase of goods and services were cut
so drastically over the past few years that this extent cannot
be increased in the long run. As family, home and consumer
price subsidies are linked at or under CPI inflation, this offers
a little room for manoeuvre for a GDP-proportionate
reduction in redistribution.
The most important expenditure item is the net expenditures
of budgetary organisations. This is especially true in election
years, as the actual government can dispose over such
expenditure items at its discretion. As regards such items, our
baseline projection is for meeting the requirements of
expenditure appropriations.
Currently, there is no approved bill for the 2009–2010
budget. Nevertheless, our projection is based on a normative
approach rather than rule-based. The reason for this is that,
as opposed to practice in earlier years, the government
announced the budget ceilings concerning the key
expenditure items for 3 years in advance. The government
intends to treat these ceilings as the expenditure
appropriations of the budget bills in the years to come. In our
opinion, these baselines are exacting and translate into lower
expenditures than the rule-based projections do. If, for these
items, our baseline scenario contained the earlier used rule-
based projection, the GDP-proportionate level of
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expenditure would be 0.3 to 0.4 percentage points higher
compared to our normative projection. Thus, an uncertainty
distribution showing a more conspicuous asymmetry than it
usually does is implied in our baseline projection.
Within the above expenditure ceilings, real wages in the
public sector are not expected to decrease further in 2008.
We expect real wages to increase somewhat over the next
two years. The way that our projection interprets the OKÉT
agreement is that the real wage increase materialises on a cash
basis. Accordingly, we now expect that in 2009 the public
sector wage bill will be approximately 3 percentage points
higher than our projection in November 2007. This excess
expenditure will absorb the majority of the savings from the
larger-than-expected layoffs in 2007.
The updated Convergence Programme expects the capital
expenditure of the general government to remain at a GDP-
proportionate level. This will, however, occur against a
simultaneous substantial rise in EU co-financing. The
replacement of own funds with EU financing will contribute
to the adjustment of the expenditure side in 2008. This
impact will also emerge in 2009, to a much lesser degree,
though. Fiscal capital expenditure will be so low in 2010 that
its replacement cannot exert any further impact.
33
A change in the size of temporary expenditure items (e.g. the
outsourcing of motorway construction under a PPP scheme,
the completion of the procurement of Gripen fighter planes
and reduction in the MÁV (Hungarian Rails) consolidation,
etc.) will lead to an approximately 1.2 percentage point
deficit reduction. Decline in temporary expenditures will
have slowed down by 2009, when mainly the outsourcing of
motorway construction, which is financed from the budget in
2008, will mean further savings on expenditures. Temporary
expenditures are no longer expected to reduce the deficit in
2010.
As a rule, a peak in the capital expenditure cycle of
municipalities coincides with election years, and we have
factored this into our baseline projection. The increase in the
deficit caused by the capital expenditure cycle my be more
moderate in 2010 than earlier, because the use of EU funds will
also replace, at least in part, own funds in this sub-sector.
Our assumption for the entire forecast horizon is that the
losses of MÁV Start Zrt. are taken into account when
corrections are made in accordance with the official accrual
method. This is justified by the fact that over 50 per cent of
the company’s revenues stem from direct budgetary transfers.
In this case only a moderated debt assumption would be
necessary in the later period.
Risk distribution in our baseline projection for
2008–2010
Our perception of the risks to the fiscal balance is different
regarding risks to revenues and expenditures. Uncertainty
surrounding the government’s ad hoc expenditure decisions
only slightly increases the likelihood of a deficit higher than
that set out in the baseline scenario in 2008, but increase it
rather markedly in 2009 and 2010.
34
At the same time risks
to revenues from taxes and contributions are symmetric in
their distribution.
The risk distribution of the deficit projection suggests the
emergence of a deficit larger than what is forecast in the
baseline projection (Chart 1) in each of the three years. Of
the factors determining the distribution, the uncertainty
surrounding the macro-economic path initially represents a
nearly symmetric risk and then points to a declining deficit
after 2008. The underlying reason for this is that, although
the risks to growth are downward, this is offset by the
likelihood of higher-than-projected inflation, which reduces
deficit (and increases revenues).
As regards uncertainty distribution for 2008, in case of items
subject to expert judgement, expenditure-side adjustment in
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33 The monitoring material compiled in April projected government investments as unchanged at a 3.6 per cent GDP-proportionate level. In practice, this means that
own-funded capital expenditure will have edged down from 2.6 basis points in 2007 to 1.0 per cent of GDP by 2009. Moreover, the pace of motorway construction
under PPP schemes will pick up, which will impact the ESA balance through current payments spread over time.
34 The fact that the opinion of EUROSTAT on the proceeds from the sale of MÁV Cargo is not known yet translates into a risk amounting to 0.4 per cent of GDP. According
to the relevant plans, MÁV would keep the proceeds; however, if it has to record them as rerouted budgetary transfer among expenditures, such will also affect the
ESA balance.
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The fan chart of the fiscal deficit
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the municipality sub-sector is especially important among the
risks suggesting a lower deficit. Municipalities curbed their
expenditures significantly in 2007. If this trend continues this
year as well, their balance may improve. In contrast, in 2008,
in terms of upside risks to deficit, the uncertainty about the
net expenditures of budgetary organisations is rather strong.
If EU funding of the projects submitted as additional projects
for the development of the motorway network fails to
materialise, and the remaining accumulated amount of the
appropriation is spent this year, a substantial expenditure
overrun may occur.
As regards expert risk perceptions for 2009 and 2010,
similarly to 2008, it is mainly the projections for the net
expenditures of budgetary organisations are asymmetrically
skewed towards a higher deficit. We see considerable
uncertainty in relation to the implementation of further
reducing of expenditures as envisaged in the Convergence
Programme. The reason why the risk perception of this
expenditure item is more asymmetric than usual is that our
baseline projection is not the standard rule-based projection.
Rather, it is a normative path defined and approved by the
government this spring.
There is also significant uncertainty surrounding the future
use of EU funds, which will be a decisive factor in the
government’s capital expenditure in the two years ahead. In
principle, paradoxically, weaker-than-expected absorption
ability may lead to a reduction in the deficit of the sub-sector
through reduction in the capital expenditure of the central
budget. If, however, the government decides to maintain the
current level of the capital investments, as EU funds decrease,
then the role of own funds becomes increasingly important.
This impact is exacerbated by the fact that, in the case of the
municipality sub-sector, stronger-than-assumed reliance on
EU funds may lead to higher indebtedness of the and hence,
a higher deficit.
35
Significant risks surround the metro construction project.
Our baseline projection assumes that the European Union
approves the project and participates in its financing to an
extent that it is planned by the Municipality of Budapest and
the Hungarian State. If EU funds the financing of a smaller
portion than what has been planned, the missing portion will
have to be financed from own funds, which may entail a rise
in the deficit. It is difficult to assess the size of the risks
associated with the metro project, as its total cost is still
uncertain and the final decision of the EU on funding the
capital investment is not yet known. In our opinion, such
risks amount to at least 0.2 per cent of GDP.
The risks surrounding MÁV used to return at regular
intervals, especially in election years, when the state-owned
rails were consolidated through mainly debt assumption. Our
expert risk assessment detects risks of a similar nature,
although the size of the risk is lower than usual because the
officially projected losses incurred by MÁV Start Zrt. and
assessed by the government were factored into our baseline
projection for the ESA deficit.
In conclusion, the asymmetry of items subject to expert
judgement is the most important factor in 2008. In 2009 and
2010, the risks stemming from the macro-economic path and
suggesting a lower deficit only mitigate the upward skewedness
of the expert projections, but they cannot offset it.
A comparison of our projection with the objectives of the
Convergence Programme reveals that the 2008 target figures
will, in all likelihood, be achieved. By contrast, in 2009 and
2010, the targets are below the baseline projection, along the
lower edge of the central band of the fan chart.
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Inflation Expected ESA deficit Expected ESA deficit Expected ESA deficit 
with a probability of 30 per cent with a probability of 60 per cent with a probability of 90 per cent
2008 3.6–4.0 3.4–4.2 3.1–4.5
2009 3.2–3.7 2.9–4.1 2.4–4.6
2010 2.7–3.4 2.4–3.8 1.6–4.5
Table 4-3
Bands of the fan chart
35 We have no reason to assume that the standard capital expenditure (election) cycle of the municipality sub-system will be more restrained in the coming 2 years than
what was experienced in earlier election cycles.
Based on the preliminary data, the combined current and
capital account, i.e. the external financing requirement,
amounted to about 4 per cent of GDP in 2007, representing
a 1.3 percentage point decline compared to the previous
year.
36,37
Regarding the real economy, the improvement in the
trade balance contributed most significantly to the decreasing
external financing requirement, which is due to the import
lowering effect of slack domestic absorption on the one hand,
and to the strong export dynamics caused by favourable
external market developments on the other hand. The
increase in European Union funds also contributed to the
decline in the external imbalance, which, as early as in 2007,
represented a net transfer revenue for Hungary
corresponding to 1.4 per cent of GDP. On the other hand,
the deficit of the income balance, primarily due to the
increased revenues of foreign-owned companies, continued
to grow.
Regarding the financing capacity of domestic sectors, it is
apparent that the improved external balance is due to the
substantial (close to 4 percentage point) decline in the
consolidated general government deficit. However, this is
only partially reflected in the external financing requirement,
since as a result of consumption smoothing, the GDP-
proportionate net savings of households declined
continuously throughout 2007, reaching a mere 1.7 per cent
for the entire year, which is just one-half the level registered
in 2006. Meanwhile, the financing capacity of the corporate
sector has also declined, but still not because of increased
investment expenditures; but due to the substantial
deterioration in profitability caused by wage increases in
excess of productivity growth, rising energy costs, and
sagging domestic demand.
In 2008, the external financing requirement should continue
to decline, still in conjunction with the decline of the
consolidated general government deficit. Although, in
contrast to our former expectations, net household savings
did not start to increase at the beginning of 2008, we still
project a turning point during the year resulting from the
combined effect of increasing real wages and moderate
consumption dynamics, which may lead to a GDP-
proportionate financing capacity slightly exceeding the level
of 2007. Since investment activities continues to be slack and
rising production costs prevent improvements in
profitability, we do not expect significant changes in the
financing capacity of the corporate sector. We expect that
half of the reduction in the government deficit may be
reflected in the improvement of the external balance, which
may correspond to a 3.4 per cent external financing
requirement in 2008.
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4.2  External balance
Chart 4-2
Developments in the financing capacity of sectors*
* Adjusted by the difference caused by imports brought forward on
account of EU accession and by the import increasing impact generated
by customs warehouses terminated due to EU accession and by the
Gripen purchases.
** The financing capacity of the corporate sector is determined as a
residual item, therefore, it contains the errors of other statistics as well. 
*** In addition to the fiscal budget, the consolidated general government
includes local governments, the ÁPV Ltd., institutions discharging
quasi-fiscal duties (Hungarian State Railways [MÁV], Budapest
Transport Company [BKV]), the MNB and authorities implementing
capital projects initiated and controlled by the government and
formally implemented under PPP schemes.
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36 In March 2008, the MNB revised foreign direct investment and related income flow figures for 2006. As a result of the revision, the official figure of the external
financing requirement for 2006 was modified to 5.3 per cent from 5.7 per cent, and parallel to that the ‘bottom up’ external financing requirement figure was also
lowered.
37 In 2007, the ‘Net Errors and Omissions’ figure in the Balance of Payments statistics declined significantly, thus the external financing requirement calculated from the
financing side decreased even more substantially, by 2.3 per cent of GDP. However, the gap between the two indices still represents 2.4 per cent of GDP.
For 2009 and 2010 we forecast a further, gradual
improvement of the external balance. The financing
requirement of the consolidated general government indicates
a decreasing tendency, albeit in smaller steps, over the entire
forecast horizon. Household consumption may increase at a
slower pace than the disposable income of households, i.e. the
net savings of households may slowly increase. At the same
time, by 2010 a recovery in corporate investments is expected
to become evident, thus the financing requirement of the
corporate sector may register moderate growth. On the
whole, the external financing requirement may sink to 2.5 per
cent of GDP in the period leading up to 2010.
Looking at the structure of the current account, the balance
of goods and services may only slightly contribute to the
improvement of external balance, because the weaker
international economy may lead to subdued Hungarian
export growth, while gradually recovering domestic
demand may result in an expansion of imports. The GDP-
proportionate deficit of the income balance might decline
somewhat, which may be attributed to the growing income
inflow as a result of foreign investment by domestic
companies. The decline in the external financing
requirement may be mainly attributed to the transfer
account.
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* In addition to the fiscal budget, the consolidated general government includes local governments, the ÁPV Ltd., institutions discharging quasi-fiscal
duties (MÁV, BKV), the MNB and authorities implementing capital projects initiated and controlled by the government and formally implemented under
PPP schemes.
** During the 2004–2007 period, uncertainty in the measurement of foreign trade statistics point toward a higher current account deficit and a higher
external financing requirement.
*** In our forecast for the ‘errors and omissions’ item of the balance of payments we assumed that the cumulated figure for the last four quarters will
remain unchanged.
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Estimation Forecast
I. Consolidated general goverment* -8.5 -8.3 -8.4 -9.4 -9.6 -5.9 -4.5 -4.4 -3.6
II. Households 2.7 0.2 2.4 4.2 3.4 1.7 1.8 2.1 2.4
Corporate sector and “error” (= A - I.- II. ) -0.9 0.1 -2.1 -0.8 0.9 0.2 -0.6 -0.5 -1.4
A) External financing capacity, “from above”(=B+C )** -6.7 -8.0 -8.1 -6.0 -5.3 -4.0 -3.4 -2.8 -2.5
B) Current account balance** -7.0 -7.9 -8.4 -6.8 -6.1 -5.0 -4.9 -4.8 -4.8
– in EUR billions** -5.0 -5.9 -6.9 -6.0 -5.4 -5.1 -5.3 -5.5 -6.0
C) Capital account balance 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.6 2.0 2.3
D) Net errors and omissions (NEO)*** 0.3 0.3 -1.7 -2.8 -3.4 -2.4 -2.3 -2.1 -2.0
External financing capacity “from below” (=A+D) -6.4 -7.7 -9.8 -8.7 -8.7 -6.4 -5.7 -5.0 -4.5
Table 4-4
Net financing capacity of individual sectors
(relative to GDP, per cent, unless otherwise indicated)
* During the 2004–2009 period, uncertainty in the measurement of foreign trade statistics point toward higher current account deficit and higher
external financing requirement.
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Fact/Preliminary fact Forecast
1. Balance of goods and services* -1.5 -2.4 -3.8 -2.7 -0.5 0.4 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4
2. Income balance -5.4 -5.4 -4.9 -6.0 -6.5 -6.9 -7.9 -7.7 -7.6 -7.5
3. Balance of current transfers 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
I. Current account balance (1+2+3)* -6.1 -7.0 -7.9 -8.4 -6.8 -6.1 -5.0 -4.9 -4.8 -4.8
Current account balance in EUR billions* -3.6 -5.0 -5.9 -6.9 -6.0 -5.4 -5.1 -5.3 -5.5 -6.0
II. Capital account balance 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.6 2.0 2.3
External financing capacity (I+II)* -5.5 -6.7 -8.0 -8.1 -6.0 -5.3 -4.0 -3.4 -2.8 -2.5
Table 4-5
Structure of the current account balance
(relative to GDP, per cent, unless otherwise indicated)
Financing the current account deficit
In 2007, the ‘bottom-up’ external financing requirement
amounted to EUR 6.5 billion, representing 6.4 per cent of
GDP. Thanks to the substantially decreased external
financing requirement, the growth of GDP-proportionate net
foreign liabilities came to a halt in 2007, but the structure of
financing shifted in an unfavourable direction form the
investors point of view: we experienced EUR 4.3 billion net
outflow of non-debt-creating funds, while debt-creating
inflows reached an all-time high, driving the net external debt
ratio up to 40.7 per cent. Dynamic foreign borrowing
characterised both the financial institutions and the corporate
sector.
The declining level of net non-debt-creating financing is
largely due to the intensive direct capital outflow generated
by a few domestic corporations, and to the increasing foreign
stock purchases of institutional investors. We need to
emphasise, however, that the external financing structure in
2007 was largely affected by two one-off transactions, which
appeared in the balance of payments statistics as net non-
debt-creating capital outflow and a corresponding level of
debt-type capital inflow.
Seeking to resist the acquisition attempts of OMV, MOL
(Hungarian Oil Company) bought up a large number of its
own shares (mostly held by non-resident investors); which
was financed partly by the disposal of some of its foreign
deposits, and partly by loans.
In the case of the foreign owned Budapest Airport there was
a change in ownership, and at the same time in the entire
financing structure of the company. The former owner
financed 100 per cent of its acquisition of the company in the
form of direct capital investment, while the new owner paid
the majority of the purchase price by loans borrowed from
foreign banks, rather than in the form of direct capital
investment.
The stabilisation of the GDP-proportionate net foreign
liabilities in 2007 broke an upward trend that had lasted for
several years, and in the case of the projected decline in the
external imbalance the ratio should start to decline slowly. At
the same time, even if one excludes the effects of the one-off
transactions in 2007, non-debt-creating foreign investments
of residents show a growing tendency, thus the external
financing structure may swing towards debt-creating
liabilities. In the long run, however, capital outflow may
0have a positive impact on the income balance, thereby
contributing to the long-term sustainability of the Balance of
Payments.
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Chart 4-3
Net external liabilities and net external debt
(as a per cent of GDP)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
Net external debt
Net non-debt-creating liabilities
Net external liabilities (-NIIP)
Per cent Per cent
38 Developments in the external financing structure are discussed in detail in an article published in the April issue of the MNB Bulletin (The structure of external
financing: Is there a reason to worry about financing through debt?).
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